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ARTICLES
Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the
Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile
Environment Harassing Speech
DEBORAH EPSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
Sandra Bundy may have guessed that her new job with the District of
Columbia Department of Corrections would be a challenge. What she may not
have expected was that she would have to meet the challenge under very
different conditions than those faced by her male coworkers. Ms. Bundy's work
was continually interrupted by one of her supervisors, who kept calling her into
his office and forcing her to listen to his theories about how women ride horses
to obtain sexual gratification.' He repeatedly asked Ms. Bundy to come home
with him in order to view his collection of pictures and books on this topic.
Another supervisor repeatedly propositioned her, asking her to come with him
to a motel or on a trip to the Bahamas.
None of Ms. Bundy's male counterparts, in contrast, had to listen to their
boss's sexual fantasies and proposals. When Ms. Bundy tried to remove this
gender-based obstacle to her job performance by reporting it to a third supervi-
sor and pleading for help, he only exacerbated the problem, telling her that "any
man in his right mind would want to rape you," and asking her to have sex with
him.
2
Ms. Bundy successfully sued the Department of Corrections for sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII, 3 the federal statute outlawing workplace
discrimination. Title VII forbids sexual harassment when it creates a discrimina-
tory hostile work environment, that is, when the harassment is sufficiently
severe or pervasive that it adversely affects the terms or conditions of employ-
ment for workers of a single gender.4 In Ms. Bundy's case, the court held that
* Visiting Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1988. I am indebted to Deborah Brake, Ayesha Khan, Susan Deller Ross, Nadine
Strossen, Anne Schroth, Michael Shuman, Mark Tushnet, and Wendy Williams for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank my research assistants, Jennifer
Ellison and Rebecca Leitman, for their energetic and thoughtful work. Finally, my heartfelt gratitude
goes out to Bill Reeves, whose computer literacy repeatedly proved itself invaluable.
1. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939, 940 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2. Id. at 940.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
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her supervisors' repeated sexual comments and propositions met-this standard,
even though their harassment was entirely verbal.
The implicit holding of the Bundy case-that speech alone can create a
discriminatory hostile work environment-went unquestioned for many years.
Recently, however, defense attorneys have challenged the constitutionality of
this principle, arguing that a prohibition on discriminatory workplace expres-
sion violates harassers' First Amendment rights.5 At the heart of this challenge
lies the conflict between two fundamental constitutional values: equality of
opportunity and freedom of expression.
Thus far, only two federal district courts have ruled on this constitutional
question.6 Although both courts upheld the plaintiffs' hostile environment claims
over free speech challenges, neither conducted a particularly rigorous First
Amendment analysis. The federal appellate courts, in which one might expect a
more thorough examination of the issue, have not yet addressed it directly.
A debate over this conflict has recently emerged among a handful of commen-
tators. The primary advocate of the constitutionality of workplace harassment
law, Professor Suzanne Sangree, argues that by removing obstacles to equality,
harassment law actually "enhances First Amendment free speech principles."
She also believes that if current regulations of harassing workplace speech must
be struck down as unconstitutional, then all of employment discrimination law
must fall with them.7
Several scholars take the opposite position and argue that most or all of Title
VII's restrictions on harassing workplace speech run afoul of the First Amend-
ment. 8 The two proponents of this view who have engaged in the most
extensive analysis are Professors Kingsley Browne and Eugene Volokh. Profes-
sor Browne argues that free speech interests require a drastic reduction in the
5. Ordinarily, the First Amendment does not apply to nongovernmental regulation of expression, and
private sector employers may restrict their workers' speech in whatever way they choose. However,
because the government has become involved in the process through judicial enforcement of hostile
environment regulations, sufficient "state action" exists to trigger First Amendment protections. Cf
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) ("Although this is a civil lawsuit between
private parties, the ... courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid
restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech .... ").
6. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
7. Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the
First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 461 (1995). Professor Marcy Strauss also
presents persuasive arguments in support of the constitutionality of hostile environment harassment
law, but her focus is a broader one: she addresses free speech issues raised by sexist speech in general,
both in the workplace and beyond. See Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1990). Although this article addresses Professor Strauss's principal arguments
relevant to workplace speech, it focuses primarily on those put forth by Professor Sangree.
8. See generally Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile
Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003 (1993);
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment-
Avoiding a Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757 (1992); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992).
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scope of hostile environment harassment law, limiting its reach to cases involv-
ing unwanted physical contact. 9 Professor Volokh also recommends narrowing
the law to cover verbal harassment only when it is intentionally directed at a
particular individual; undirected expressions of gender-based intolerance, he
believes, should go unregulated.1°
This article stakes out a middle ground between Sangree on the one hand and
Browne and Volokh on the other, and it responds to the principal arguments they
have marshalled. Unlike Professor Sangree, I believe that hostile environment
harassment law generates a fundamental conflict between equality of opportu-
nity and freedom of expression. But a thorough examination of the nature and
weight of each of these fundamental interests, in the distinct context of the
workplace, demonstrates that a balance can be struck.
Part I of this article focuses on the equal opportunity side of the scale by
examining the harm inflicted when a woman 1 is subjected to harassing speech
on the job. Sexual harassment has been called "one of the most ubiquitous and
damaging barriers to women's [job] success and satisfaction,"' 12 and a large
portion of this problem stems from verbal harassment.13 Abusive and harassing
speech damages a female employee's psychological and physical health and
often adversely affects her job performance, while her male counterparts remain
free of such gender-based obstacles. As this discussion demonstrates, Professors
Browne and Volokh's underestimation of the scope and gravity of this discrimi-
natory harm has skewed their constitutional analysis.
Part II begins with an analysis of the elements of proof that must be met to
support a hostile environment claim and reveals the fallacy of the often-repeated
complaint, echoed by Browne and Volokh, that the law is so vague that no one
really knows what is illegal. I then consider the argument, asserted by several
commentators, that workplace harassment law is subject to unconstitutionally
overbroad enforcement. The discussion places in perspective the few cases in
which women have accused men of sexual harassment with scant grounds for
doing so. Although a small number of such cases have succeeded at trial, a
review of the law's ten-year enforcement record shows that a far greater number
of women are denied relief after being subjected to substantial discriminatory
abuse. Rather than enforcing harassment law too broadly and imposing liability
when it is not justified, as Browne and Volokh suggest, the courts are doing the
opposite-constructing the law too narrowly and failing to punish many serious
harassers.
9. Browne, supra note 8, at 544-45.
10. Volokh, supra note 8, at 1848-7 1.
11. The vast majority of gender-based workplace harassment cases involve male harassers and
female targets. Although cases exist in which the gender roles are reversed, for the sake of convenience
I will refer to harassers as male and targets as female.
12. Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in Academia
and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 154 (1988).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 22-38.
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I then address the question of whether hostile environment harassment law
has a significant chilling effect on speech beyond its intended scope and argue
that it does not. Even in a conduct-based sex discrimination case, a defendant's
harassing statements are admissible to show that he acted with discriminatory
intent. Accordingly, laws prohibiting discriminatory conduct already create an
incentive for employers to censor their workers' gender-based abusive and
harassing speech. A chilling effect therefore will persist even if a cause of action
for verbal harassment is abolished.
Part III of this article focuses on the other side of the scale-the free speech
rights of workplace harassers. It explores the context in which the regulated
speech occurs and argues that both the physical restrictions of the job site,
where employees are captive and typically unable to avoid harassing speech,
and the power hierarchy of the workplace, which limits employees' ability to
respond to such speech, operate to reduce the strength of harassers' First
Amendment rights on the job. Context has long been a pivotal part of First
Amendment jurisprudence, and Professors Browne and Volokh fail to devote
sufficient attention to the unique nature of the workplace.
Part IV analyzes hostile environment harassment law under the First Amend-
ment strict scrutiny test. The government's interest in prohibiting discriminatory
workplace speech is of the highest order, because it is expressly based on
Congress's duty to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
This compelling government interest, in conjunction with the necessity of
hostile environment harassment law and its narrowly tailored definition, demon-
strates that the law passes strict scrutiny.
Finally, in Part V, I discuss the Supreme Court's indication that it might
uphold workplace harassment law over a free speech challenge on the basis of
the recently developed "secondary effects" exception. In this Part, I describe
the dangers inherent in expanding this exception beyond the confines of sexu-
ally explicit speech and conclude that the Court would be unwise to move in
this direction.
I. THE HARM INFLICTED BY HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSING SPEECH
A full understanding of the harm inflicted by harassing workplace speech is a
necessary prerequisite to any attempt to determine the appropriate balance
between the government's interest in protecting citizens from such speech and
the First Amendment's guarantee of free expression. As Professor Charles
Lawrence has noted, "To engage in a debate about the first amendment and
[discriminatory] speech without a full understanding of the nature and extent of
the harm of [such] speech risks making the first amendment an instrument of
domination rather than a vehicle of liberation." 14
14. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DuKE L.J. 431, 459; see also Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
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Sexual harassment has been called the most widespread problem faced by
women on the job. 15 A 1981 United States Merit Systems Protection Board
("MSPB")16 survey of approximately 23,000 federal employees found that
42% of all women and 15% of all men had experienced some form of sexual
harassment at work. 17 When the MSPB conducted a follow-up study in 1988,
these numbers remained virtually identical.' 8 Recent surveys conducted in the
private sector demonstrate that about 59% of women executives are harassed at
some point in their careers.' 9 Other surveys have shown that women experience
sexual harassment in the workplace at even higher rates, ranging from 42% to
88%.20 Approximately 15% of women working for Fortune 500 companies
experience sexual harassment on an annual basis.
2 1
Harassing speech accounts for a substantial portion of the problem. The
majority of sexual harassment complaints involve allegations of verbal harass-
ment. 22 One survey shows that two-thirds of working women have been sub-
jected to verbal harassment on the job.2 3 In 1994, a survey of 2000 lawyers at
twelve large law firms across the nation showed that 91% of the women and
13% of the men had been subjected to unwelcome verbal harassment within the
past year.24 A recent survey of 182 women who work in traditionally male
industries (including plumbers, electricians, carpenters, fire fighters, and police
15. See Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 336, 342 (1981) (statement of Karen Sauvigne, Program
Director of Working Women's Institute); see also 106 L.R.R. News and Background Information
333-35 (Apr. 27, 1981) (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting Chair of EEOC) (noting that sexual
harassment is widespread problem); Matthew C. Hesse & Lester J. Hubble, Note, The Dehumanizing
Puzzle of Sexual Harassment: A Survey of the Law Concerning Harassment of Women in the Work-
place, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 574 (1985). The vast majority of victims of sexual harassment are women,
although between 1990 and 1994 the proportion of complaints filed by men increased from 8% to 10%,
according to the EEOC. Jane Gross, Now Look Who's Taunting, Now Look Who's Suing, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 1995, § 4, at 1.
16. The MSPB is a quasi-judicial federal agency responsible for hearing appeals of personnel
actions taken against federal employees. See 5 C.F.R. § 1200.1 (1994).
17. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE-IS IT A
PROBLEM? 81 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 MSPB SURVEY].
18. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN
UPDATE 16 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 MSPB SURVEY].
19. Sharon Walsh, Hushing Up Harassment?, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1995, at HI (citing 1993
Korn-Ferry Survey).
20. Mark Pazniokas, Capitol Confronts Sexual Coercion, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al;
see also Kara Swisher, Laying Down the Law on Harassment: Court Rulings Spur Firms to Take
Preventive Tack, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1994, at HI (citing survey finding that 40% to 60% of women say
they have been sexually harassed at work). Sexual harassment complaints filed with the EEOC more
than doubled between 1991 and 1993. Id.
21. Walsh, supra note 19, at HI (citing 1993 Korn-Ferry survey and recent Klein Associates survey).
22. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 115 (1987); Strauss, supra note 7, at 11.
23. WORKING WOMEN'S INST., RESEARCH SERIES REP. No. 3, THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON
THE JOB: A PROFILE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF 92 WOMEN (1970) [hereinafter WWI, A PROFILE].
24. Margot Slade, Law Firms Begin Reining in Sex-Harassing Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1994,
at A 19. The survey asked whether the lawyers had experienced unwelcome sexual advances in the form
of sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, or questions; pressure for dates; letters, phone calls, cartoons, or other
materials of a sexual nature; sexually suggestive looks or gestures; or pressure for sexual favors.
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officers) revealed that 83% received unwelcome sexual remarks, and 88% were
forced to view pictures of naked or partially dressed women in the workplace.25
Professors Browne and Volokh acknowledge that gender-based verbal harass-
ment can result in employment discrimination, but neither recognizes the
seriousness of the problem. This is particularly true of Professor Browne, who
fails to engage in any substantial discussion of the harm that discriminatory
harassing speech can inflict on a female worker and how that harm can create
substantial obstacles to her success on the job.26
Professor Browne claims that it is "far from clear that sexuality implies a
lack of respect .... [T]here is no necessary contradiction in viewing one's
colleague (or even one's subordinate) simultaneously as an attractive sexual
being and a competent co-worker.", 27 But there is a significant difference
between viewing a coworker as a sexual object and acting on that view. The vast
majority of women dislike being subjected to sexual expression at work, finding
it "embarrassing," "demeaning," or "intimidating." Only a small minority of
women report that they see such expression as "flattering." ' 28 Perhaps at some
point in the future, when women are less frequently stereotyped as mere erotic
playthings, sexualizing a subordinate employee will carry with it no derogatory
connotation. Today, however, that is the exception, not the rule.
Gender-based harassment of female employees subjects them to an extensive
range of harms not experienced by their male colleagues. These harms often
include an adverse effect on a woman's job performance. 29 The 1981 MSPB
Survey showed that harassment victims suffered in terms of the quantity and
quality of their work, their ability to work with others, and their attendance
record.3 ° Other studies have found that between 45% and 75% of sexual
harassment victims experience some adverse effect on their work performance. 31
25. In addition, 57% were subjected to offensive touching or requests for sex. LAURIE W. LEBRETON
& SARA S. LOEVY, BREAKING NEW GROUND: WORKSITE 2000, A REPORT PREPARED BY CHICAGO WOMEN
IN TRADES 10-12 (1992).
26. See generally Browne, supra note 8. While Professor Volokh admits that harassing speech may
inflict harm on its targets, he is solely concerned with "the most egregious sorts of harassment" that
involve "truly harrowing abuse." See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1807-09.
27. Browne, supra note 8, at 491 n.60.
28. Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment
Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345, 361 n.85 (1980) (citing Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on
the Job, 148 REDBOOK 149, 217 (1976)); see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1208-12 & n.l 18 (1989); Ben Bursten,
Psychiatric Injury in Women's Workplaces, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 245, 247 (1986). While
men are more likely to feel flattered than threatened by sexual remarks in the workplace, women tend to
worry that such comments could escalate and lead to sexual assault. Gross, supra note 15, at 1.
29. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 n.8 (9th Cir. 1991); Peggy Crull, Stress Effects of
Sexual Harassment on the Job: Implications for Counselilg, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 539, 541
(1982) (noting that 75% of women who had been sexually harassed reported that their job performance
had suffered).
30. 1981 MSPB SURVEY, supra note 17, at 81.
31. WORKING WOMEN UNITED INST., SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE JOB: RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY
SURVEY (1975) [hereinafter WWI STUDY] (noting that 45% of victims reported an adverse effect on job
[Vol. 84:399
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In the two-year period from May 1985 to May 1987, the federal government
incurred estimated expenses of $267 million in sexual harassment-related costs,
including money lost through decreased worker productivity, sick leave awards,
and replacement of employees who left their jobs because of sexual harassment.32
Hostile environment harassment also can hurt the target's psychological and
physical well-being. A study conducted by the Working Women's Institute
shows that 96% of sexual harassment victims experience emotional distress and
35% suffer from physical stress-related problems.33 Typical symptoms include
anger, fear, anxiety, depression, guilt, humiliation, embarrassment, nausea, fa-
tigue, headaches, and weight gain or loss.
3 4
Gender-based harassing expression that is sexual in nature, such as nude or
seminude photographs of women and sexual jokes or slurs, harms women by
encouraging men to view them as sex objects who should be treated according
to that purpose alone.35 In the workplace context, this not only undermines a
woman's dignity, but also her efforts to function in a different role. 36 It
encourages men to evaluate female employees based on qualities unrelated to
job performance.37 As Professor Kathryn Abrams explains:
Pornography on an employer's wall or desk communicates a message about
the way he views women, a view strikingly at odds with the way women wish
performance); WWI, A PROFILE, supra note 23 (noting that 75% of victims reported adverse effect on
job performance).
32. 1988 MSPB SURVEY, supra note 18, at 39.
33. WWI STUDY, supra note 31.
34. For example, one study showed that 90% of victims of sexual harassment felt anger, fear, and
nervousness, and 63% experienced nausea, headaches, and fatigue. WWI, A PROFILE, supra note 23; see
also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1496, 1506 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (finding that
workplace harassment caused plaintiff to feel anxious, have difficulty sleeping, and miss several days of
work); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 783 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (stating that employee's
doctor diagnosed her anxiety, diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, and cramping as caused by workplace
harassment); Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 751, 775 (1989) ("Sexual harassment victims experience powerlessness, humiliation, fear, and
loss of self-confidence and self-esteem.").
35. See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1502-05 (crediting expert testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske on sexual
stereotyping); Taub, supra note 28, at 361 (arguing that sexual comments toward women are "quintes-
sential expression of stereotypic role expectations"); see also Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.
Supp. 847, 880-83 (D. Minn. 1993) (discussing expert testimony of Dr. Eugene Borgida on sexual
stereotyping).
36. Although some women may appreciate such sexual expression in the workplace, most do not.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
37. See Abrams, supra note 28, at 1208-12 (discussing how courts need to be more responsive to
harassment that denies women a sense of professional respect); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and
the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 471, 484 (1990) (discussing how
relationship of sex stereotypes and notions of power are linked, thus making it more difficult for women
to enter positions of power); Taub, supra note 28, at 361 (discussing how sexual harassment affects a
woman's ability to perform by decreasing both her own sense of self and how she is perceived by male
supervisors); Thomas L. Ruble et al., Sex Stereotypes: Occupational Barriers for Women, 27 AM.
BEHAV. Sci. 339, 351 (1984) (discussing how sex stereotypes perpetuate the notion that women will do
poorly at a masculine task, thus leading to slower progress for women); see also Robinson, 760 F. Supp.
at 1503-04 (discussing expert testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske on sexual stereotyping).
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to be viewed in the workplace. Depending on the material in question, it may
communicate that women should be objects of sexual aggression, that they are
submissive slaves to male desires, or that their most salient and desirable
attributes are sexual. Any of these images may communicate to male cowork-
ers that it is acceptable to view women in a predominantly sexual way.38
The cases challenging gender-specific abuse and gender-based sexually harass-
ing speech provide compelling examples of the harms identified above. In
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. , 9 for example, Lois Robinson worked
as a welder and as one of a few female skilled craftworkers employed by a
shipyard.40 At work, Ms. Robinson was repeatedly subjected to sexual and
gender-specific harassing comments: a male welder told her that he wished her
shirt would blow over her head so he could look at her breasts; a shipfitter told
her that he wished her shirt was tighter; another told her that "women are only
fit company for something that howls," and that "there's nothing worse than
having to work around women"; and a foreman asked her to sit on his lap.
Coworkers further harassed Ms. Robinson by placing gender-specific abusive
and sexual graffiti on the workplace walls. For example, a coworker wrote over
the place where Ms. Robinson hung her jacket, "lick me you whore dog bitch";
and another wrote "pussy" on a wall of her work area when she left to get a
drink of water.4 1
Ms. Robinson also was surrounded by prominently displayed pictures that
depicted women in various stages of undress and in sexually suggestive or
submissive poses,4 2 including: a dart board made out of a drawing of a woman's
breast, with her nipple as the bull's eye; a picture of a naked woman with long
blond hair, wearing high heels and holding a whip (Ms. Robinson found this
picture particularly troubling because she has long blond hair and works with a
welding tool known as a "whip"); a picture of a nude woman, with legs spread
and breasts and genitals exposed; a drawing of a naked woman with fluid
flowing from her genital area; a picture of a woman's pubic area with a spatula
pressed on it; a drawing of a naked woman with the caption "USDA Choice"; a
picture of a naked woman playing with a piece of cloth between her legs; and
calendar photos depicting nude and partially nude women. Ms. Robinson's male
coworkers made frequent sexual comments about these pictures in her presence,
such as "I'd like to have some of that" and "I'd like to get into bed with
that." 43 No similar pictures of men were displayed.4
38. Abrams, supra note 28, at 1208, 1212 n. 118.
39. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
40. Id. at 1491.
41. Id. at 1498-99.
42. Id. at 1493. In direct contrast, Jacksonville Shipyards denied employees' requests to post
political and commercial materials in the workplace. Id. at 1494.
43. Id. at 1494-97, 1513.
44. One foreman at the shipyard testified that if he ever saw a picture of a nude or semiclad man he
would throw it in the trash. Id. at 1494.
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After Ms. Robinson complained to shipyard management, the number of
displayed pornographic pictures actually increased.45 Ms. Robinson testified
that this constant barrage of sexual and gender-based hostile comments and
pictures made her feel extremely anxious, caused her to have difficulty sleeping,
and resulted in her having to miss several days of work each year.46
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,4 7 Teresa Harris spent more than three years
working as a manager for an equipment rental company. During that time, she
was frequently subjected to gender-specific abusive speech. The company's
president, Charles Hardy, repeatedly stated to Ms. Harris, in the presence of her
fellow employees, "You're a woman, what do you know?," called her a "dumb
ass woman," and told her that the company needed a man to do her job.48 Hardy
also made numerous sexually suggestive requests, asking Ms. Harris to retrieve
coins from his front pants pocket by saying, "Teresa, I have a quarter way down
there. Would you get that out of my pocket?" He threw objects on the ground in
front of Ms. Harris, asking her to bend over and pick them up, and suggested
that female Forklift Systems employees should dress in a way that would
expose their breasts. He also told women workers that he had heard that eating
corn would make their breasts grow. In the presence of other employees, Hardy
proposed that he and Ms. Harris "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [her]
raise." Hardy also suggested to Ms. Harris that they should start "screwing
around.", 4 9 There was no evidence that similar gender-specific abuse or sexually
suggestive remarks were made to male employees.
Ms. Harris asked her boss to stop making these comments, and he promised
to do so. But soon afterwards, when Ms. Harris was negotiating a deal with a
customer, Hardy asked her, in front of her fellow employees, "What did you do,
promise the guy.., some bugger Saturday night?" 50
In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,51 Vivienne Rabidue, an administrative
assistant, was forced to work with a supervisor 52 who routinely referred to
women as "whore," "cunt," "pussy," and "tits," all gender-specific derogatory
terms focused on female sexuality or sexual body parts. With respect to Ms.
Rabidue, the supervisor stated, "All that bitch needs is a good lay." Ms.
Rabidue was exposed on a daily basis to posters and pinups of naked and
partially naked women, including one poster, which remained on the wall for
eight years, depicting a prone woman with a golf ball on her breasts with a man
45. Id. at 1500-01.
46. Id. at 1519.
47. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
48. Id. at 369.
49. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168).
50. Id. at 8. The term "bugger" refers to anal intercourse.
51. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
52. Although the supervisor had no direct authority over Ms. Rabidue, he ranked higher than she did
in the company's hierarchy, and his position carried significant authority. Ms. Rabidue was forced to
interact with him on a regular basis. Id. at 615.
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standing over her, golf club in hand, shouting "Fore.", 53 No evidence was
submitted suggesting similar treatment of Ms. Rabidue's male counterparts.
54
As these examples demonstrate, Professor Browne is wrong when he claims
that expression of racist and sexist sentiments are no longer socially acceptable
and, accordingly, there is no longer a need for the "protectionist doctrine" of
workplace harassment laws.55 In fact, gender-based harassing speech continues
to force women to perform their jobs under adverse conditions not imposed on
men. This discrimination perpetuates the historic inequality between men and
women in the workplace that Title VII was designed to remedy, "operat[ing] as
overt exclusion once did to erect a significant barrier to equality in the work-
place." 56
II. POORLY DEFINED LAW OR POORLY INFORMED CRITICS? HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT AND THE DOCTRINES OF VAGUENESS,
OVERBREADTH, AND CHILLING EFFECT
A frequently stated complaint about workplace harassment law, particularly
with regard to harassing speech, is that it is so poorly defined that no one really
knows what is legal and what is not. Countless news stories in the popular press
describe men tiptoeing around the workplace, afraid that if they unintentionally
offend a female worker, she will file a harassment suit. 57 A television talk show
host recently complained about a "rush to judgment ... against the male" in
harassment cases, and commented, "You can sue anybody for anything.",
58
Legal commentators like Professor Browne have parroted this refrain, asserting
that the law "give[s] little notice of what expression is prohibited," and that
53. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting in part).
54. The Sixth Circuit ruled against Ms. Rabidue, finding that the sexualized slurs directed at her
were merely "annoying," and that the "sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on
[her] work environment when considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly features
and commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on
prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other public places." Id. at 622.
55. Browne, supra note 8, at 544.
56. Strauss, supra note 7, at 5.
57. See, e.g., Janet Cawley, Political Correctness Has Its Own Backlash, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 25, 1994,
at 19 (quoting business consultant, "I know high-level executives who refuse to talk to women in their
offices without the door open. Men are very much afraid of [being accused of] sexual harassment.")
(internal ellipsis omitted);- John Powers, Afraid to Offend, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 1994, at 7 ("Most
folks seem to agree that [workplace] harassment is a bad thing. Few of them agree on what it is.");
Stephen Robinson, The Fifty Million Dollar Insult, DAILY TEL. (London), July 5, 1995, at 15 (stating
that workplace harassment law has given men "a fear of tripping unawares into deep water"); Maureen
West, $43 Million for Accused Harasser, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Apr. 7, 1995, at B7 (noting "the fear many
a man has that any time he accompanies a female co-worker to lunch it could be a career-buster day");
John Seigenthaler, Freedom Speaks, Mar. 17, 1995 ("It's very tough for me to know what I can say and
what I can't say. Without some definition, how is one to know?") (transcript of television program, on
file with The Georgetown Law Journal).
58. Laura Flanders, Paula Jones and Sexual Harassment: The World Stayed Right-Side Up, EXTRA!,
July-Aug. 1994, at 5 (quoting John McLaughlin).
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once expression has "been labelled as racist or sexist, all [of it] has been
deemed regulable" by the courts5 9
The First Amendment requires specificity in any restriction on expression.
Although a law need not be defined with "mathematical certainty," it must
provide potential violators with adequate notice of what is prohibited. 60 Al-
though some limited elaboration of what constitutes actionable harassing speech
would be useful, examination of the legal definition of harassing speech and its
stringent proof requirements makes clear that, contrary to the claims of Profes-
sors Browne and Volokh,6 ' the law is far from vague.
A. FORMS OF PROHIBITED WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
Congress enacted Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
eliminate certain forms of workplace discrimination. Specifically, Title VII
makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex,6
2 or national origin.",
63
Although Title VII clearly prohibits gender-based workplace discrimination,
it does not expressly set forth a cause of action for harassment. Approximately
ten years after the statute's enactment, however, the courts began to recognize
that certain forms of harassment, when inflicted on workers of only one gender,
constitute prohibited discrimination. 64 This concept was later adopted by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in its Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex,65 and in 1986 it was unanimously embraced by
the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.66 Seven years later, in its
59. Browne, supra note 8, at 502, 548.
60. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1971).
61. See Browne, supra note 8, at 502-10; Volokh, supra note 8, at 1812 & n.97.
62. The statute's prohibition on gender discrimination was a last minute addition, made through an
amendment on the floor of the House of Representatives. The amendment, adding "sex" to Title VII's
list of prohibited bases for discrimination, was proposed by conservative opponents of the civil rights
legislation who believed that it would lead to the defeat of the entire bill. Norbert A. Schlei, Foreword
to BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW at xi-xii (2d ed. 1983).
The strategic maneuver backfired, however, and Congress enacted the bill as amended. Id. at xii.
Because of the eleventh-hour status of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination, little legislative history is
available to assess congressional intent as to this provision.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
64. The first opinion to hold that Title VII prohibits harassment as a form of workplace discrimina-
tion arose in the racial harassment context. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 957 (1972). The first Title VII sexual harassment case was Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654 (D.D.C. 1976). In Williams, the court held, without actually using the term "sexual harassment,"
that a supervisor's repeated harassment and humiliation of the plaintiff after she refused his sexual
advances constituted a violation of Title VII. Id. at 657-58.
65. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1995). Although the
EEOC has not been granted the authority to promulgate substantive regulations, the courts consistently
have relied on the agency's Guidelines in interpreting Title VII.
66. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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most recent pronouncement on harassment law, the Court unanimously reaf-
firmed that Title VII's prohibition on gender discrimination incorporates a ban
on gender-based harassment.6 7
Perhaps the most widely discussed form of gender-based harassment is
sexual harassment, defined by the EEOC as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature,"' 68 directed at members of one gender and not the other. Illegal sexual
harassment exists in two distinct forms. In a "quid pro quo" case, the target of
the harassment, because of her gender, is coerced into performing an unwel-
come sexual act as part of a bargain to obtain an employment benefit or avoid
an employment disadvantage. Quid pro quo harassment is essentially the equiva-
lent of extortion or blackmail, and, accordingly, it is not subject to First
Amendment protection.6 9
The second form of sexual harassment prohibited under the Guidelines,
"hostile environment" harassment, exists when an employee, in contrast to
similarly situated workers of another gender, is subjected to a workplace so
"permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that [it] is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and
create an abusive working environment.",
70
Other forms of gender-based workplace harassment that are not sexual in
nature also may constitute illegal discrimination. The EEOC has recognized that
gender-specific abuse is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
create a hostile work environment. 7' Recently, in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., the Court upheld the imposition of Title VII liability based in part on a
supervisor's abusive but nonsexual comments to a woman subordinate that were
based specifically on her gender, such as "You're a woman, what do you
know"; "We need a man [to do yourjob]"; and "[You're] a dumb ass woman." 72
Although gender-specific harassment 73 and gender-based sexual harassment
are conceptually different, most courts and numerous commentators have failed
67. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
68. 29C.FR. § 1604.11(a).
69. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (citations omitted). As these definitions make plain, quid pro quo and
hostile environment claims may arise in a single sexual harassment case.
71. In its Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, the EEOC notes that "sex-based harassment-
that is, harassment not involving sexual activity or language-may also give rise to Title VII liability
(just as in the case of harassment based on race, national origin, or religion) if it is 'sufficiently
patterned or pervasive' and directed at employees because of their sex." EEOC Policy Guidance on
Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6692 (Mar. 19, 1990). The EEOC proposed
new guidelines covering nonsexual gender-based harassment in 1993, but these guidelines have not yet
been adopted. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin,
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (1993).
72. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 369.
73. This term originates from the Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund and the National Council of Jewish Women, submitted in support of petitioner in Harris, 114 S.
Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168). To date, neither the courts nor the EEOC has articulated a definitive term
applicable to this form of workplace harassment.
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to distinguish between the two, referring to both as "sexual." This confusion
may stem in part from the frequency with which both forms of harassment arise
in a single case, and from the identical standard of proof, the creation of a
hostile environment, which applies to both.
B. THE ELEMENTS OF A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT CLAIM
Professors Browne and Volokh perpetuate the widespread misunderstanding
of hostile environment harassment law by consistently referring to it as a
prohibition on all speech that subjectively "offends" the listener, and by
inventing a misleading parade of horribles designed to create the impression
that harassment law censors all speech that fails a politically correct litmus
test.74 But in fact, as an examination of the requisite elements of a hostile
evironment harassment claim demonstrates, the "mere utterance of an ...
epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee ... does not suffi-
ciently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII. ' 75
1. Harassment Must Be Gender-Based
A victim of workplace harassment must show that, but for her gender, she
would not have been the object of harassment.76 When sexual harassment or
gender-specific abuse is directed at workers of both sexes, it does not constitute
discrimination on the basis of sex and is therefore not actionable under Title
VII. For example, an early, often-cited case indicates that when a bisexual
supervisor sexually harasses both male and female subordinates, no gender
discrimination occurs, because "the insistence upon sexual favors ... would
apply to male and female employees alike.", 77
74. See Browne, supra note 8, at 521, 530, 535, 539-40, 542-43, 548, 550. In similar vein, Browne
incorrectly characterizes the law as an attempt to "decrease the amount of offense suffered by the
groups intended to be protected" and to " 'prevent ... bigots from expressing their opinions in a way
that abuses or offends their co-workers'," id. at 543, 504 n. 153, describes Title VII supporters as those
who "advocate eliminating First Amendment protection for offensive speech," id. at 543, and else-
where states, "[a] mighty conviction that 'women should not be sex objects' or that 'bigotry is bad' is
an insufficient basis for attempting to outlaw expressions of those views." Id. at 536. Professor
Volokh's article contains many similar misstatements. See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1809, passim
(noting that harassment law threatens employers with liability if they do not punish employees who
"say offensive things").
75. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
76. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1995). Although
this article focuses on gender-based harassment, the same elements are applicable to hostile environ-
ment claims based on race, color, religion, or national origin.
77. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc.,
839 F.2d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir.) (reaching same conclusion in case involving nonsexual gender-specific
abuse), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 524 F.2d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.
1975) (same). This line of cases creates an anomalous liability gap by barring a harassment victim from
legal recourse simply because her harasser happens to be bisexual. It is difficult to believe that Congress
intended to hand bisexual persons a free pass to engage in workplace abuse. The obstacle created by the
law's gender-based requirement in the case of a bisexual harasser requires substantial attention that is
beyond the scope of this article.
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2. The Employer or Its Agent Must Perpetrate or Condone the Harassment
Title VII applies to employers, not to the individual personnel who engage in
harassing or otherwise discriminatory behavior.78 As a result, hostile environ-
ment liability may be imposed on an employer only if it had sufficient notice of
its occurrence and, despite this fact, failed to take prompt and effective remedial
action.79
The requisite notice depends on the identity of the harasser. If the harasser is
a supervisor, acting within the actual or apparent scope of his authority, notice is
automatically imputed to the employer.8° If the harasser is a nonmanagement
employee, the courts generally impute notice to the employer only when a
supervisor or other agent knew or should have known of the harassment.
8
'
Once an employer has adequate notice, it may avoid liability by taking
remedial action that is reasonably calculated to end the harassment. 82 Typically,
this would include conducting an investigation of the harassment allegations
83
and, if they are substantiated, disciplining the harasser. Appropriate disciplinary
action varies on a case-by-case basis and may range from a warning to
termination.
Title VII hostile environment liability therefore lies only when the employ-
er's authority is used to perpetrate the harassment, or when the employer
implicitly condones the harassment because it has notice and fails to take
corrective action.
3. Harassment Must Be Severe or Pervasive
Harassment will trigger Title VII liability only if it is "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the [terms, privileges, or] conditions of [the target's] employ-
ment and creates an abusive working environment.", 84 The required showing of
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
79. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 66-72; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). An employer may be held liable without
notice only when he provides no reasonable avenue for a victim to report a complaint. See, e.g.,
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
80. See, e.g., Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780. In cases involving quid pro quo harassment, in contrast,
employers are strictly liable for the acts of their employees. See, e.g., id. at 777.
81. See, e.g., Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 E2d 59, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1992).
82. See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065
(1987).
83. Some courts have held that remedial action is insufficient if no investigation occurs. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distrib., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 343, 344 n.2 (8th Cir. 1991).
84. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)). To be actionable, sexual harassment must have "the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment." EEOC Employment Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1995).
The courts have interpreted the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" quite broadly.
According to the Supreme Court, the phrase "evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to
work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367,
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severity varies inversely with the pervasiveness of the abuse. The more perva-
sive or frequently occurring the harassment is, the less severe or serious it need
be to support liability, and vice versa.
85
The EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment acknowledges that, as a
general rule, verbal harassment is inherently less severe than physical harass-
ment. 86 For this reason, a single instance of gender-based abusive speech will
rarely, if ever, be sufficiently "severe" to support the imposition of liability.
87
Because verbal harassment tends to fall low on the severity scale, it is likely to
be actionable only when it is pervasive and permeates the work environment of
employees of only one gender. The courts have acted in accordance with this
rule and have not imposed Title VII liability on the basis of a few, occasional
incidents of verbal harassment.88
4. Harassment Must Be Unwelcome to Its Target
Another prerequisite for imposition of Title VII hostile environment liability
is that the harassment must be "unwelcome." ' 89 Harassment is unwelcome if the
victim did not invite it and regards it as offensive or undesirable. 90 This
requirement evolved out of a recognition that consensual sexual relationships
can occur in the workplace; even conduct or speech that discriminates, by
creating a different environment for members of one gender and not the other, is
not illegal if the target appreciates it and does not view it as harmful.
The unwelcomeness requirement protects employers from liability unless and
until a victim indicates that she wants the harassment to stop. A victim may
communicate unwelcomeness by directly informing her harasser or an appropri-
ate supervisor that particular actions or comments are unwelcome, or she may
do so through her conduct, by removing offensive pictures, by erasing or
370 (1993) (citations omitted). Thus, harassment need not affect the terms set forth in a worker's
employment contract to be actionable. It is enough if the harassment has such an adverse effect on a
worker's regular job conditions that it creates an abusive work environment.
85. EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 71, at 405:6689-91.
86. Id. at 405:6691 ("More so than in the case of verbal advances or remarks, a single unwelcome
physical advance can seriously poison the victim's working environment.").
87. It is possible that a single, credible threat of rape would be sufficient to meet the hostile
environment severity requirement. For purposes of free speech analysis, however, such a statement
constitutes a criminal threat and is not entitled to First Amendment protection.
88. Courts have held that harassment is not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile
environment when it consists of any of the following: an offensive racial or gender epithet, Harris, 114
S. Ct. at 370; gender-related jokes and occasional teasing, Hallquist v. Max Fish Plumbing & Heating
Co., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1855, 1860 (D. Mass. 1987); two requests for dates by coworkers,
Robinson v. Thornburgh, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 324, 326 (D.D.C. 1990); an obscene message
from coworkers and a sexual solicitation from another coworker, Freedman v. American Standard, 41
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 471, 476 (D.N.J. 1986); one sexual invitation, Sapp v. City of Warner
Robins, 655 F. Supp. 1043, 1049 (M.D. Ga. 1987); and casual or sporadic racist comments, Johnson v.
Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981).
89. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1995).
90. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564-65 (8th Cir. 1992) (analyzing
"unwelcomeness" as element of quid pro quo claim); Chamberlain v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777,
784 (lst Cir. 1990) (same).
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obliterating graffiti, by complaining about the speech, or by consistently failing
to respond to her harasser's suggestive comments. 9 ' When a victim's attempts
to communicate unwelcomeness to her harasser are not sufficiently clear and
direct, her hostile environment claim will fail. 92 Title VII thus regulates harass-
ing speech only when the harasser clearly has been put on notice that his target
wishes him to stop-and he refuses to do so.
A limited exception exists for certain extreme forms of harassment, which are
so patently degrading that the courts presume unwelcomeness and do not
require specific proof on this issue. For example, when a supervisor pretended
to masturbate and ejaculate behind a female employee's back, the court held the
actions to be of "such a degrading nature that no ordinary person would
welcome them," and required no affirmative proof of unwelcomeness.93
5. Harassment Must Create a Subjectively and Objectively Hostile Work
Environment
Finally, hostile environment harassment law requires the victim to prove not
only that she personally found that the harassment created a hostile or abusive
work environment, but also that a "reasonable person" would agree with her.94
The reasonableness requirement ensures that gender-based abusive or sexual
acts are not restricted whenever they offend the fragile sensibilities of a hypersen-
sitive listener, but only when they rise to an objectively abusive level.
91. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68 (holding that welcomeness turns on "whether [plaintiff] by her
conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome"). The employer may then avoid
liability by taking prompt and effective action to stop future incidents of harassment. See supra text
accompanying notes 78-83. For an extensive report of fact patterns that have been held to either satisfy
or fail Title VII's unwelcomeness requirement, see Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of
Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 513-20 (1994).
92. See, e.g., Kouri v. Liberian Servs., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 124 (E.D. Va. 1991), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 865 (1992). Many courts have applied an extremely narrow definition of the
welcomeness requirement. In Kouri, for example, Karen Kouri worked as a secretary for her company's
personnel director, James Todd. Todd harassed Kouri continuously over a six-month period, during
which he regularly insisted on escorting her when she needed to go to the bathroom or to her car,
frequently tried to hug or kiss her, gave her back rubs at the office, repeatedly insisted on driving her
home and entering her house and bedroom, and accused her of having affairs with other coworkers.
Kouri attempted to stop this harassment by signalling to Todd that she was happily married. She
arranged for her husband to send her flowers and come to the office to visit her. In the court's view, Ms.
Kouri's actions were "hopelessly indirect," and it ruled against her, holding that she had failed to prove
that she did not welcome her boss's actions. See also Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125-27
(10th Cir. 1993) (finding conduct not unwelcome when plaintiff only viewed it as "disgusting and
degrading"); Tindall v. Housing Auth., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 22, 26 (W.D. Ark. 1991)
(finding conduct not unwelcome when plaintiff kept allegedly offensive cartoon and freely joined in
sexual jokes with coworkers); Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315,
1319 (D.N.J. 1983) (finding conduct not unwelcome when no evidence that plaintiff objected to
language used on floor of plant); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D.
Mo. 1982) (finding conduct not unwelcome when plaintiff herself used profane and sexually suggestive
language).
93. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1148, 1150
(N.D.N.Y. 1990).
94. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
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Taken together, these five proof requirements create a concrete definition of
illegal gender-specific abuse and gender-based sexual harassment, and they
focus the law's regulatory reach on its most objectively extreme, persistent, and
unwelcome forms. Viewed against this background, it is clear that, contrary to
Professor Browne's suggestion, the sole statement, "Women do not belong in
the medical profession; they should stay home and make babies!" does not
constitute "sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.' 95 A complaint based on
such a statement, standing alone, could not survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.
96
C. THE LOW RISK OF OVERBROAD ENFORCEMENT AND CHILLING EFFECT
Because Professors Browne and Volokh fail to understand the elements of a
hostile environment claim, they conclude that harassment law prohibits all
offensive speech. They then argue that the legal definition of workplace harass-
ment is so unclear that it is constitutionally impermissible. In their view, this
vague definition enables the courts to engage in "overbroad" enforcement by
outlawing speech that should be protected, and it encourages employers to
"chill" workplace speech by engaging in widespread censorship to avoid
litigation.97 But as the following discussion demonstrates, neither of these
potential threats to the First Amendment has been realized.
1. Harassment Law and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
According to current Supreme Court doctrine, a regulation of expression
must be struck down as overbroad if, in addition to its constitutionally permis-
95. Browne, supra note 8, at 481.
96. Browne offers no evidence that male workers were free from analogous hostile comments, that
the comment was made or condoned by the target's supervisor or boss, or that it was "unwelcome" to
the target (the listener might well agree and wish her financial status allowed her to stay home with her
children). This single comment fails the pervasiveness test, and pursuant to applicable case law it is not
severe. Finally, even if the listener personally felt that the comment was sufficiently abusive to alter her
work environment, it would be hard to find a "reasonable person" to agree with her.
Professor Browne's other hypotheticals are similarly flawed. In one, an employer attempts to comply
with Title VII by directing his workers not to use any form of profanity in the presence of a woman.
Browne, supra note 8, at 488. This rule appears old-fashioned and paternalistic, and Browne condemns
it as based on "just the sort of stereotype [of women being more easily offended than men] that Title
VII was intended to erase." Id. But all of this has little to do with the requirements of hostile en-
vironment harassment law. As Professor Browne himself concedes, "Title VII is not a 'clean language
act,' " id. at 492 (quoting Katz v. Doyle, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)), and the law does not
prohibit profanity in the workplace, unless it meets all five of the stringent elements of a discrimination
claim. A more appropriate hypothetical would be a situation in which every day women workers are
subjected to insulting profanity based on their gender, with their coworkers repeatedly referring to them
as "bitch," "cunt," or "tits," while no such gender-based profanity is directed at their male counterparts.
97. Browne, supra note 8, at 501-10; Volokh, supra note 8, at 1812. Professor Sangree also criticizes
Browne's and Volokh's arguments regarding overbreadth and chilling effect. See Sangree, supra note 7,
at 528-32. In her critique, however, Sangree conflates these two conceptually distinct issues. The
overbreadth doctrine focuses on potential overenforcement by courts in the context of a litigated case.
"Chilling effect" focuses on potential prelitigation overenforcement by employers, through harassment
policies and the like, designed to prevent a challenge from reaching a court in the first place.
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sible applications, the courts might interpret it to restrict otherwise protected
speech. 98 All speech restrictions have the potential for some degree of over-
broad enforcement; 99 it is only when this risk is "substantial" that it violates the
Constitution.' 0 0 Professors Browne and Volokh argue that workplace harass-
ment law creates precisely this risk, and therefore must be significantly modi-
fied' ' or invalidated in its entirety. 1
0 2
Historically, overbreadth challenges have been brought immediately after a
speech-restrictive law goes into effect, forcing the court to assess the risk of
substantial overbreadth in the abstract. But such a theoretical analysis is not
necessary in the context of Title VII's prohibitions on hostile environment
harassment. Courts have enforced these restrictions for almost ten years without
impeding First Amendment rights.' 0 3 This ample, concrete enforcement record
actually demonstrates that the courts have interpreted hostile environment
harassment law far too narrowly, allowing a great deal of discriminatory speech
(and conduct) to go unregulated. The primary danger, therefore, is not the one
contemplated by Professors Browne and Volokh-that harassment law is en-
forced too broadly-but that it is enforced too narrowly.
Each of the following scenarios of harassing workplace speech has been held
to be insufficiently severe or pervasive to support the imposition of hostile
environment liability: a male coworker's four requests over a four-month period
that plaintiff have sex with him;' 4 a manager's request that plaintiff sit on his
face; 105 a male coworker's calling a plaintiff a "cunt" and a "douche bag cunt,"
shaking his crotch at her, and occasionally giving her "the finger";'0 6 and a
supervisor's three sexual propositions to a female attorney employed as the
company's Manager of Equal Employment Opportunity Programs, including
one suggestion that he take her to a hotel because she supposedly needed the
"comfort of a man." ' 0 7
Even when hostile environment harassment has involved physical touching
as well as verbal abuse, the courts have interpreted the regulatory reach of
harassment law quite narrowly. For example, one court held that harassment
was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support liability when, over an
98. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
99. Even a highly specific statute, such as one outlawing threats to kill the President, holds some risk
of overbroad enforcement, perhaps against someone who claims that his "threat" was made in jest.
100. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 (stating that "overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep").
101. See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1843-70.
102. See Browne, supra note 8, at 484.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 118-27.
104. Hollis v. Fleetguard, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 631, 636 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), affid, 848 F.2d 191 (6th
Cir. 1988).
105. Wolf v. Burum, No. 88-1233-C, 1990 WL 81219, at *7 (D. Kan. May 16, 1990).
106. Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr. Auth., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852, 1866
(D.N.J. 1990), affid mem., 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991).
107. Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720-21 (5th Cir. 1986); see also supra text accompanying
notes 51-54.
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eight-month period, a male quality control inspector requested several times per
week that a female coworker "suck him" or "give him head," repeatedly
grabbed her crotch and breasts, once pointed to her crotch and stated, "Give me
some of that stuff," and, in addition, another male inspector exposed his penis
and placed it in her hand.'0 8 In another case, a sheriff made numerous sexual
advances toward and once raped a county ambulance dispatcher, but the court
held that the harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive.109 A court
refused to impose liability when a supervisor repeatedly requested that an
automobile mechanic trainee go out on dates with him and suggested that he
give her a "rubdown," and coworkers repeatedly slapped her on the buttocks
and told her that they thought she must "moan and groan" while having sex. 10
Finally, a court found in favor of the defendant-when, over the course of approx-
imately two months, a supervisor touched a female security guard's buttocks,
stating, "I'm going to get you yet," grabbed her breasts and said, "I got you,"
and subjected her to several threats of physical violence and verbal abuse. 1
As these cases demonstrate, Title VII's restrictions on workplace harassment
hardly present a situation of "overbreadth run amok," as one commentator
proclaims." 2 Instead, they show that the scope of judicial enforcement has been
excessively restrained," 13 and many lower courts, like Professors Browne and
Volokh, have failed to fathom the seriousness of the harm inflicted by discrimina-
tory workplace harassment, whether verbal or physical in nature. The results
reached in many of these cases reveal the deeply troubling fact that the lower
courts are failing to provide women workers with the protection to which they
are legally entitled, and instead are creating obstacles to workplace equality.
Admittedly, as Professors Browne and Volokh point out, several far less
serious workplace harassment complaints have been filed, and a small number
of these have even succeeded at trial. These cases invite ridicule (and a
108. Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1565-66 (M.D. Fla. 1990), affid, 949
F.2d 1162 (11 th Cir. 1991).
109. Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d 996, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1989).
110. Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 211-14 (7th Cir. 1986).
111. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1410-11 (10th Cir. 1987).
112. Gerard, supra note 8, at 1028.
113. This pattern of narrow judicial enforcement contrasts sharply with the broad administrative
enforcement of university hate speech codes. For example, the University of Michigan speech code was
applied to punish a social work graduate student who stated in class that he believed that homosexuality
was a disease, and that he intended to develop a counseling plan for changing gay clients into
heterosexuals; a Business School student who read a homophobic limerick in an entrepreneurship class
public speaking exercise; and a dentistry student who stated, in a class reputed to be especially tough,
that he had heard that minorities had a difficult time in the course and were not treated fairly. See Doe v.
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 865-66 (E.D. Mich. 1989). In all three of the First Amendment
challenges brought against university hate speech codes, the courts have struck them down as
unconstitutionally overbroad. See Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1185 (6th Cir. 1995);
UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe,
721 F. Supp. at 867. For a more extensive discussion of the enforcement history of campus speech
codes, see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 484, 528.
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disproportionate amount of media coverage), but they are the exceptions to the
rule. If the constitutionality of any legal principle was determined on the basis
of the most frivolous filings and most bizarre judicial misapplications, little
legislation would survive scrutiny. What matters here is that in the vast majority
of cases, the judiciary is not engaging in overbroad enforcement, but instead is
failing to impose liability on employers who create discriminatory, adverse job
conditions for women workers on the basis of their gender.
2. Harassment Law and the Danger of a Chilling Effect
Professors Browne and Volokh further argue that hostile environment harass-
ment law has a significant chilling effect, suppressing not only the discrimina-
tory expression that the law targets, but also protected expression that is beyond
its intended scope. They assert that this chilling effect is exacerbated by the fact
that Title VII imposes liability on employers rather than on individual speakers;
an employer is more likely to be concerned about its potential liability than
about allowing employees to speak freely. Professor Browne maintains that the
result has been "a relentless campaign of government-mandated workplace
censorship," 114 and asserts that "[t]he rational employer ... does not prohibit
merely the expression of actually prohibited language; it prohibits, and pun-
ishes, all expression that could even arguably be viewed as impermissible." "15
But this claim of massive censorship is hard to square with the ever-
increasing number of harassment suits that continue to be filed. Surveys show
that gender-based harassment persists even though the threat of Title VII
liability has hung over employers' heads for almost ten years. 116 As Professor
Sangree points out, "the fact that employers have generally not banned all
nonwork-related speech from workplaces, despite their power to do so,,
7
demonstrates that employers recognize the potentially adverse impact of speech
restrictions on employee morale." " 8
Professor Browne challenges this assessment, claiming that the persistence of
workplace harassment is irrelevant because "no matter what efforts employers
make, they are not going to be completely effective at preventing employees
from offending each other." "9 If, however, employers were overregulating, and
only disobedient employees were engaging in harassing speech, one should see
more employers asserting, as a potential defense to liability, that they made their
best efforts to prevent harassment by drafting and enforcing draconian, speech-
restrictive antiharassment policies. There is no evidence of such an increase.
114. Kingsley Browne, Muzzling Sexually Hostile Speech, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 22, 1993, at 26.
115. Browne, supra note 8, at 505.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
117. Employers could impose such a broad ban on employee speech consistent with the First
Amendment because no state action would exist. See supra note 5.
I 18. Sangree, supra note 7, at 551.
119. Kingsley Browne, Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree, 47 RUTGERs L.
REV. 579, 584 (1995).
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Even if we assume that employers are engaging in some degree of overregula-
tion of employee speech, the problem cannot be resolved by modifying or
eliminating hostile environment harassment law, because a chilling effect would
still arise out of Title VII's clearly permissible prohibition on intentional
discriminatory conduct.'20 When a worker brings a Title VII disparate treatment
case, claiming that she was terminated, demoted, or subjected to some other
adverse employment action based on her gender, she is required to prove that
the alleged discriminatory conduct was intentional.' 2 ' Typically, she does so
through her employer's statements, and the admissibility of speech for this
purpose is well settled.' 22 The Court repeatedly has held that the First Amend-
ment "does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech ... to prove motive or
intent. Evidence of a defendant's previous declarations or statements is com-
monly admitted in ... trials subject to evidentiary rules dealing with relevance,
reliability, and the like." 123
Thus, even if hostile environment harassment law were completely abolished
and Title VII's reach were limited to cases of discriminatory workplace conduct,
employers still would have an incentive to censor their workers' gender-based
speech to eliminate potential complainants' principal source of proof of illegal
intent. The potential for chilling expression therefore would still exist; retaining
a cause of action for verbal hostile environment harassment does little to change
this.
Finally, contrary to the assertions of Professors Browne and Volokh, an
employer can easily create a narrow, speech-protective antiharassment policy
that minimizes any chilling effect. One strategy is to explain to workers that
they may make gender-specific or sexual comments until they receive an
indication from a particular employee that such statements are unwelcome.
Employers can provide training on how to recognize expressions of unwelcome-
ness, which should include both the suggestion that silence may in some
circumstances indicate unwelcomess and the suggestion that if a female employ-
ee's response is unclear, the best strategy is to ask how she feels. Once a worker
has indicated that the speech is unwelcome, the speaker should be directed to
either stop or set up a meeting with an in-house, designated EEO officer for
120. See Sangree, supra note 7, at 558.
121. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (setting forth elements
of Title VII disparate treatment prima facie case); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973) (same).
122. For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), a woman who was denied
partnership at an accounting firm challenged the decision as intentional sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII. Her evidence of the firm's discriminatory intent included repeated comments by one
partner that "he could not consider any woman seriously as a partnership candidate and believed that
women were not even capable of functioning as senior managers." Id. at 236. These statements were
held admissible to prove illegal intent, and the Supreme Court relied on them (among other evidence) in
holding in Ms. Hopkins' favor. Id. at 256-58.
123. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993). Professor Browne acknowledges that such
evidence is admissible to prove discriminatory motive, provided it is more probative than prejudicial.
Browne, supra note 8, at 545.
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advice. The employer can regularly encourage workers to report immediately
any incidents that they consider abusive or harassing and ensure that a victim-
friendly grievance procedure exists. Complainants should be assured of anonym-
ity and of a rapid investigation of their allegations. By educating workers about
the scope of hostile work environment harassment law and by creating griev-
ance procedures that allow effective responses to harassment complaints, an
employer can protect itself from liability while allowing workers substantial
breathing room for expression.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT
The significance of context pervades First Amendment jurisprudence. Several
categories of expression, such as those encompassed by the captive audience
and time, place, and manner doctrines, are entitled to a lesser degree of
constitutional protection not based on the content of the speech, but on the
physical, temporal, or interpersonal context that surrounds it.' 24 In some situa-
tions, context is significant because it creates the potential for speech to inflict
serious harm. Children in grade school learn that although the Constitution
protects their right to shout falsely "Fire!" in the middle of the woods, they
cannot do so in a crowded theater.125 Both the physical context of a confined
space and the interpersonal context of a crowd are important here; they convert
otherwise protected speech into a "clear and present danger" to the audience
and make government regulation of such expression constitutionally permis-
sible.
Another important aspect of context is its role in determining an individual's
expectation of privacy and related desire to be free from unwanted speech. In
recognition of this context-driven expectation, the Court has developed a location-
based continuum for regulating expression, ranging from maximum tolerance
for speech restriction in places where a person's need for privacy is greatest,
such as her home, to minimal tolerance in public fora such as parks, streets, and
sidewalks. ' 2
6
Professors Browne and Volokh analyze harassing expression in a vacuum,
124. The First Amendment Free Speech Clause reads: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although it appears on its face to be an absolute
ban on government regulation of expression, courts and commentators have read numerous exceptions
into the Clause. In addition to the context-based exceptions noted above, other exceptions, such as
obscenity, carve out limited categories of expression based on subject matter and remove them entirely
from the scope of First Amendment protection.
125. In his famous hypothetical, Justice Holmes stated, "The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The version that is typically repeated in the popular press and
numerous Supreme Court opinions has been modified to assume a crowded theater. See, e.g., R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (White, J., concurring); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.).
126. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412
(1974).
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entirely divorced from its context. Consequently, they miss one of the most
important aspects of the interplay between harassment law and the First Amend-
ment: hostile environment harassing speech occurs in the workplace. 27 For
purposes of First Amendment analysis, the workplace has two essential contex-
tual components: a physical context, such as an office or a factory, and a less
tangible interpersonal context, a hierarchy of authority that is symbolized by the
"corporate ladder." These two contexts must be carefully explored to determine
the appropriate scope of First Amendment protection for hostile environment
harassing speech.
Professor Volokh's focus on content over context may stem from his fundamen-
tal failure to understand that the regulatory reach of hostile environment harass-
ment law is generally limited to speech that occurs in the workplace.128 And as
described below, Professor Browne touches on the context issue only briefly,
summarily concluding that "the term 'workplace' is not a talisman that extin-
guishes first amendment protections. ... [W]orkers do not shed [their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech] at the factory gate." 129 This statement is
correct in its black and white terms, but it fails to recognize the existence of
gray zones. Workers' free speech rights are not surrendered entirely on the job,
but they are limited to some extent by physical and interpersonal contextual
constraints.
A. THE PHYSICAL CONTEXT OF THE WORKPLACE
Whether the workplace is a factory, office, or construction site, it is a setting
in which employees are typically unable to avoid gender-based harassing
speech. Outside of the workplace, an individual has a far greater degree of
choice, and in most instances can avoid erotic, pornographic, or gender-specific
abusive expression. "Girlie" magazines typically are not openly displayed on
newsstands; radios and television sets have power switches and channel chang-
127. Of course, such speech also occurs in other contexts, such as the university campus, where
similar issues have been raised and debated. See infra text accompanying notes 153-58. That debate,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
128. Professor Volokh claims that the idea that "a hostile work environment can be created by
speech outside the workplace.., is accepted as a matter of law." Volokh, supra note 8, at 1848. Neither
of the two cases he cites supports his claim. In Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991), the
court relied in part on a letter, mailed by a male employee to a woman worker at a job training site.
Although the site was located away from the main office, it was still her workplace during the training
period. In Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F2d 934, 940 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court relied in part on a
telephone call made by a supervisor to a woman worker's home-in addition to numerous instances of
abusive speech at the office. But this case was decided four years before the EEOC published its first
Guidelines dealing with sexual harassment, and five years before the Supreme Court recognized a cause
of action for a hostile work environment.
I have not been able to locate a single post-Vinson case in which extraworkplace speech was relied
on to support a hostile environment claim, and I do not believe that any exist. If such a case arose,
however, I would argue that consideration of the speech as support for the existence of a hostile work
environment should turn on whether the harasser has supervisory or other workplace authority over the
victim. See infra text accompanying notes 165-88.
129. Browne, supra note 8, at 516.
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ers; and movies are rated for sex, violence, and profanity.' 30 A pedestrian on the
street is free to walk away 31 and avoid all but the initial impact of unwanted,
gender-based abusive or sexually harassing expression; this may constitute a
painful blow,' 32 but at least additional rounds may be avoided.
The workplace is different. If pornography or gender-specific abusive slogans
are openly displayed in areas that a female worker must frequent to perform her
job, she loses the power to avoid such speech. When a woman must choose
between routinely viewing gender-based demeaning or abusive expression and
quitting her job, her choice can hardly be labelled a "free" one.
The Court has long recognized that physical context places limits on a
person's ability to avoid unwanted speech. The "captive audience" doctrine
evolved out of this recognition, and it creates a context-based balance between
the listener's right to personal privacy and the speaker's right to express himself
freely. 133 As a general rule, the doctrine gives priority to the speaker's rights
over the listener's and dictates that if a listener is offended or otherwise harmed
by speech, First Amendment principles require her to avoid it. Whenever
possible, a person must walk away from speech that she does not wish to
hear. 134 Any other rule would cede too much censorship power to the govern-
ment and enable it to restrict otherwise protected speech solely on the basis of
speculation that the targeted audience may be offended or unwilling to listen. 1
35
130. Some of these examples are borrowed from the Brief of the Women's Legal Defense Fund et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 25 n.22, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993)
(No. 92-1168).
131. Such a person is in a situation similar to that of someone in a courthouse lobby who is
confronted by a controversial political message, such as "fuck the draft." See Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 16, 21 (1971).
132. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 452 (discussing immediate and severe nature of harm inflicted by
racist speech).
133. The right to personal privacy has been interpreted to include the right to be free from the
intrusions of the outside world. It defines the limit of where the public domain ends and the individual
one begins. Among other things, the right to personal privacy protects the individual from the intrusion
of unwanted communication. "Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any
unwanted communication, whatever its merit." Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S.
728, 734 (1970).
The conflict between freedom of speech and privacy also has arisen in a different but related
context-that of the right to remain silent. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), for example, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits public school officials from
compelling the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to participate in a pledge of allegiance. The Court noted
that coercing an individual to express patriotism would violate "the sphere of intellect and spirit" that
the First Amendment "reserve[s] from all official control." Id. at 642. This decision and other related
opinions indicate that the Free Speech Clause incorporates a right to privacy. For a comprehensive
discussion of this issue, see Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken
To?, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 153 (1972); Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1854 (1983).
134. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 210-11 (1975); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22.
135. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
4 (1949). It is a fundamental tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that one of the "function[s] of
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
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But free speech interests are not always paramount in constitutional balanc-
ing. The captive audience doctrine permits limited regulation of expression in
situations in which the targeted audience is not only unwilling to listen to
speech but is also "captive," because she has no realistic way to avoid it. The
theory here is that "the right of some people to hear what they want to hear, or
to say what they want to say, must at times yield to the right of other people to
avoid being forced to hear the speech." 136 For example, a municipality may
regulate focused picketing in front of a residence, because the target resident is
figuratively, if not literally, trapped and left with no ready means of avoiding the
unwanted speech. '
37
The need to protect the privacy of a captive audience may be strongest when
the speech in question intrudes into the unwilling listener's home, which the
Court has described as "the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick." ' 38
In Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep 't,13 9 the Court applied the captive
audience doctrine to uphold a statute allowing the Postal Service, upon an
individual resident's request, to stop a mail-order company from continuing to
send him advertisements that he finds unacceptably sexual or provocative. 40
The Court held that the right of the resident to be free from unwelcome
expression was stronger than the right of the mailer to communicate.1 4 The
captive audience doctrine also has been applied to prevent harassing telephone
calls and other forms of communication from entering the home of an unwilling
listener.' 42 Victims of telephone harassment are not required to avoid such
speech by hanging up on the caller or by screening calls through an answering
machine or voice mail. As one court put it, "the right to express ideas does not
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger." Tenniniello, 337 U.S. at 4.
136. Strauss, supra note 7, at 13. Justice Douglas, one of the most stalwart defenders of free
expression, repeatedly recognized the importance of the right of the listener to avoid unwelcome
speech. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion), for example, he
stated that there is "no right to force [a] message upon those incapable of declining to receive it." Id. at
307 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
137. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486-87.
138. Id. at 484; Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949). The "State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and
privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society." Frisby, 487 U.S. at
484.
139. 397 U.S. at 728.
140. Id. at 729-30.
141. Id. at 736-37.
142. See Gormley v. Director, Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir.)
(upholding constitutionality of antitelephone harassment statute), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980);
Von Lusch v. C & P Telephone Co., 457 F. Supp. 814, 819 (D. Md. 1978) (same).
Similarly, in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978), the Court held that the captive
audience doctrine extends to protect the privacy of listeners in their homes from "indecent" radio
broadcasts. I cite Pacifica not because I agree with its reasoning (the concept that a person is truly
"captive" to a radio broadcast is hardly persuasive when she can so easily flick a switch and turn the
radio off), but to give the reader a complete picture of existing doctrine in this area.
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include the right to impose the communication of those ideas on an unwilling
listener.... Citizens have a right to speak. Citizens also have a right not to be
forced to listen." 143
Professor Volokh argues that the captive audience doctrine applies only to
speech that occurs in the home and therefore cannot encompass hostile environ-
ment harassing speech.' 44 Nothing in First Amendment doctrine or principle,
however, supports this view. ' 45 Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant
to apply the captive audience doctrine to speech that occurs beyond the confines
of a listener's home, it has. done so in situations in which the listener is unable
to avoid unwelcome speech without significant burden. For example, the cap-
tive audience doctrine allows regulation of: expression in public buses, because
some riders have no realistic transportation alternative; 46 the speech of anti-
choice protestors outside of abortion clinics, because a patient may be captive
due to medical circumstance; 147 and the speech of perpetrators of telephone
harassment, whether they are calling their victims at home, at the office, or
elsewhere. 48 This expansion of the doctrine is a principled one; an individual's
personal privacy and integrity does not stop at the door of her home, but travels,
at least to some extent, with her. In a physical setting in which an individual is
"captive," some carefully tailored regulation of expression should be permitted.
The same principle should protect targets of gender-specific abuse and sexu-
ally harassing speech in the workplace. Just as a resident is trapped in the home,
a commuter is trapped on a bus, and a patient is trapped at a doctor's office,
workers are trapped in the workplace and cannot realistically escape the harm
inflicted by discriminatory harassing speech.
Professor Volokh claims that "employees are no more and no less captive to
offensive [expression] than are people in the street."' 49 Professor Browne
143. Von Lusch. 457 F. Supp. at 819. Even in the home, however, limitations exist on the
government's ability to regulate speech on the basis of the captive audience doctrine. In Consolidated
Edison Co., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), the state Public Service Commission
prohibited a utility from placing written inserts in its billing envelopes promoting nuclear power or
other political matters. The utility challenged the restriction and the Court struck it down, holding that
"even if a short exposure to [the utility company's] views may offend the sensibilities of some
consumers, the ability of the government to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is
dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner." Id. at 54 1.
144. Volokh, supra note 8, at 1833-40; see also Browne, supra note 8, at 516-20; Gerard, supra note
8, at 1031.
145. See Sangree, supra note 7, at 515-17.
146. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion).
147. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2528 (1994); id. at 2533 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part).
148. Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1991); Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 984 (1988); Gormley v. Director, Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938
(2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978).
149. Volokh, supra note 8, at 1839. He elaborates, "[I]f captivity consists of an inability to avoid
offensive speech, in today's society we are all 'captive' to profanity. We may walk away from someone
who is using it, but we cannot avoid it altogether-we hear it wherever we go." Id. at 1840. This
argument fails to recognize that degrees of "captivity" exist. The mere fact that a person walking down
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suggests that workers constitute a captive audience in the workplace only if one
believes that individuals lack free will, "have little control over their lives[,]
and are thus 'captives' wherever they might be."' 50 These arguments are
particularly inaccurate in the case of working women, who because of the very
discrimination that Title VII is designed to eliminate, face particularly daunting
hurdles if they decide to leave their jobs and attempt to find new ones. To put it
simply, women who cannot afford to be unemployed cannot avoid harassing
speech in the workplace. Female employees therefore constitute the quintessen-
tial captive audience. The Constitution does not and should not force a woman
into a Hobson's choice between quitting her job or facing a work *environment
in which she is subjected to severe or pervasive harassing speech that is not
inflicted on her male counterparts. 5 '
Because women are less captive outside of the workplace, hostile environ-
ment harassment law has only a limited application there. Once a potential
harasser leaves work, he is free to express any view he wishes without interfer-
ence, regardless of the extent to which it could harm members of one gender
and not the other. Consider the example of a man who bumps into a female
colleague in a bar across the street from the office. If he makes comments about
her physical appearance, asks her to go out on a date, or asks her to have sex
with him, she is likely to feel more free to choose whether to listen to him,
engage in a conversation, or leave without risking her job. If she is indeed not
captive, she may be required to bear the burden of avoiding speech when it is
unwelcome. Hostile environment harassment law, as interpreted by the courts
and the EEOC Guidelines, appropriately distinguishes between these two differ-
ent contexts in regulating expression.1
5 2
In contrast, the broad university hate speech codes that have proliferated in
recent years fail to make such context-based distinctions. A fierce debate has
the street cannot fully insulate herself from abusive or offensive speech does not mean that she is in a
situation comparable to that facing the worker in the workplace. The woman on the street can avoid all
but the initial impact of abusive speech; the worker on the job cannot.
150. Browne, supra note 8, at 520.
15 1. Hostile environment harassment law also meets the other two requirements of the captive
audience doctrine. First, the law leaves open ample alternative channels of communication by allowing
individuals to engage in harassing speech: (1) with any listener in the workplace so long as his speech
is neither so severe nor so pervasive that it affects the terms or conditions of her employment; (2) with
any listener in any manner, unless and until she indicates that his speech is unwelcome; and (3) with
any person, in any manner, outside of the workplace. See supra text accompanying notes 84-93.
Because the law constitutes neither a complete ban on discriminatory workplace speech nor a
restriction on speech outside of the workplace, it does not "permit[] majoritarian tastes completely to
preclude a protected message from [reaching] a receptive, unoffended minority." FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, the law is narrowly tailored. See
infra text accompanying notes 240-54.
152. The situation changes when the harasser is the woman's supervisor. A supervisor has coercive
power and authority over his workers, which makes them "captive" to his speech whether they are at
the worksite or elsewhere. As a result, if a management-level harasser subjects one of his employees to
sexual propositions or other gender-based abusive speech outside of the workplace, it is possible that
such speech could form the basis for a hostile environment harassment claim.
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raged among scholars over the constitutionality of these codes, 53 although they
consistently have been struck down by the courts when challenged on First
Amendment grounds. 1
54
University hate speech codes typically are designed to regulate "words that
wound" 155 the listener, regardless of the physical context in which the expres-
sion occurs. Their restrictions apply on every part of campus, at any time of day
or night, to all aspects of university life. 156 Most of these codes do not
distinguish between locations in which a student cannot avoid harassing speech,
such as in the classroom when a professor directs it toward her,157 and those in
which she has greater ability to walk away, such as on the campus green or
pathways. 15 8 Accordingly, workplace harassment law fits far more easily into
the parameters of traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, and even those
opposed to campus hate speech codes could still support regulation of verbal
harassment on the job.
Of course, the "workplace" is not a single, uniform physical setting. Profes-
sor Sangree errs by analyzing the physical location of the job site as a mono-
lithic entity. 159 Many work sites contain areas that are relatively avoidable, such
153. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Marjorie Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on
"Words that Wound," 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1983); Nan Hunter & Sylvia Law, BriefAmici
Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21
MICH. J.L. REF. 69 (1989); Lawrence, supra note 14; Strossen, supra note 113.
154. Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1185 (6th Cir. 1995); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board
of Regents Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1174 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.
Supp. 852, 864 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
155. The phrase is Professor Delgado's. See Delgado, supra note 153.
156. Dambrot, 839 F. Supp. at 477; UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1163; Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 852.
157. See Strossen, supra note 113, at 505-06. Similarly, a student cannot escape a peer's harassing
speech when it occurs in her dorm room. In these situations, the university context is more directly
analogous to that of the workplace, and some regulation of hate speech may be permissible on the basis
of a captive audience argument.
158. The difference between the purpose of a university and that of a workplace also is significant
for First Amendment analysis. The essential purpose of a university is to facilitate a vigorous exchange
of ideas and robust debate. "[T]he classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas." Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Several writers analyzing the First Amendment implica-
tions of campus hate speech codes have emphasized this point. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 113, at
502-03; Lawrence & Gunther, Good Speech, Bad Speech, STAN. LAW., Spring 1990, at 4, 7. But see J.
Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399, 415-16 (1991)
("The university should properly be seen as a distinct social entity, whose commitment to enhancing the
quality of speech justifies setting minimum standards for the manner of speech among its members.").
In contrast, "the workplace is for working"; although workers' speech is valuable and important, the
workplace differs from a university in that it is not designed as a forum for employees to "discuss
matters of great importance to themselves, perhaps to society as a whole, but not to the employer." May
v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1986). A number of restrictions on
the free speech rights of workers have been upheld on the ground that the purpose of the workplace is
to get work done. For example, even government employees, whose speech on matters of public
concern is generally subject to First Amendment protection from the state-as-employer, may not engage
in expression if it "impairs ... harmony among co-workers" or "interferes with the regular operation
of the [employer's] enterprise." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
159. Sangree, supra note 7, at 538-43.
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as personal lockers or work stations. In these enclaves, the captivity argument
diminishes in strength. If a woman worker has no work-related need to enter an
area and can readily avoid it, then she cannot be deemed "captive" to expres-
sion that is verbalized or posted there.
The difficulty lies in defining what part of the workplace is avoidable.
Consider the example of an individual's personal office. If the office belongs to
a supervisor, it may be critically important for other workers to have access to
it, either to accomplish their jobs effectively or to make personal connections
that could result in a raise, promotion, or other job-related benefit. A rule of law
that allows a supervisor to plaster the walls of his office with nude photographs
of people of one gender, or gender-specific abusive slogans, presents workers of
the targeted gender with an unacceptable choice: face abuse on the basis of your
gender or avoid contact with management and weaken your position on the job.
The office of a nonsupervisory employee presents its own difficulties. If other
workers need not enter his office, and his door is always closed, it would appear
that female workers would not be captive in this portion of the workplace, and,
therefore, First Amendment protections would be strong. Certainly it is a place
where harassment law should not prohibit an employee from reading porno-
graphic magazines or similar materials when he is alone. But if gender-based
expression that otherwise would constitute harassment is allowed here, the
office could rapidly turn into an "old boys club," in which male coworkers
congregate, socialize, and cement the interpersonal bonds that can contribute
substantially to one's ability to get ahead on the job. Once this happens, women
have a work-related need to frequent this office, to make the same connections
as their male counterparts, and then they are captive to any expression posted
there. As these examples illustrate, no principled First Amendment line can be
drawn at the doors of individual offices or cubicles within the workplace.
Perhaps the only context-sensitive line that can be drawn is one that sets off
those spaces that are truly avoidable and are not gathering places that could be
dominated by members of a single gender. This would entail creating a narrow
exception for personal spaces that are sufficiently small that people cannot
assemble in them. Such spaces might include a worker's private locker, a corner
of his office that is not open to the gaze of those who must enter it, or the
interior of his tool box. Because this kind of small, quintessentially private
space within the larger physical context of the workplace may be readily
avoided by those who wish to do so, an individual should be able to post
pornography or other gender-based materials there for his own enjoyment. 160
160. Of course, the precise definition of a sufficiently private space will vary from case to case. In
Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994), for example, a fire
fighter challenged a broad government-imposed ban on "sexually-oriented magazines, such as Playboy,
Penthouse and Playgirl" in all work locations. Id. at 1434. But the fire station in question included
dormitories divided into individual sleeping areas, where, in the absence of an emergency, fire fighters
were free to read, watch television, and relax. As the court noted, these dormitories "offer sufficient
privacy for a fire fighter to read a magazine ... without exposing the contents to an unwitting
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To date, only one federal court has found that truly private expression can
contribute to the formation of a gender-based hostile work environment. In that
case, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., the court's decision that the
employer had illegally discriminated against the plaintiff was based in part on
its findings that Penthouse and Playboy magazines were kept in desk drawers
for male employees to read; an employee had a pornographic magazine in his
personal possession; and pictures of nude or partially nude women were posted
in employee lockers. 6 ' These pieces of evidence, however, comprised a tiny
percentage of the overwhelming proof of a hostile environment that was
presented at trial. 162 In the three other federal cases in which liability was
imposed based on quasi-private harassment-specifically, the posting of porno-
graphic pictures on open locker doors16 3-the courts also relied on enormous
quantities of decidely public abusive expression and conduct. For example, Sue
Waltman's suit against International Paper Company was based in part on
sexually oriented calendars posted in employee lockers, which were kept open,
but she also proved that her coworkers broadcasted obscenities about her over
the company's public address system; an employee told her he would cut off her
breast and shove it down her throat, and later dangled her over a stairwell more
than thirty feet above the floor; one coworker pinched Ms. Waltman's breasts
and another grabbed her thigh; her supervisor and others urged her to have sex
with a coworker and made sexually suggestive comments like "I would like a
piece of that" (referring to Ms. Waltman); a supervisor repeatedly pinched her
buttocks with pliers and tried to put his hands in her back pockets; she received
over thirty pornographic notes in her locker, including such statements as "Sue
sucks everybody's dick," "Sue is a whore," "I am going to eat Sue's pussy,"
and "Sue has a nice pussy," and the words "Sue is a whore" were scratched in
the paint on the elevator in eight-inch letters.64
onlooker," and therefore the employees should be permitted to read anything they wish without
government interference. Id. at 1434, 1442.
161. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1494-95 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
163. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1471-75 (3d Cir. 1990); Waltman v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1989); Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853,
863 (E.D. Okla. 1985).
164. Waltman, 875 F2d at 470-71. Similarly, when patrol officer Mona Arnold sued the City of
Seminole, Oklahoma, her claim was based in part on a picture of a nude woman posted on a locker
door-which was always kept open and was in full public view-under which was written Ms.
Arnold's name and the words, "Do women make good cops-No-No-No." Arnold, 614 F. Supp. at
863. But Ms. Arnold also proved that pornographic cartoons directed at her were posted in the officers'
quarters and in the station house for public view, including a picture of a man having sex with a goat
with Ms. Arnold's name written over the goat; her fellow officers commented that women were not fit
to be police officers, and one told her that he would harass her until she quit or was fired; numerous
false officer misconduct complaints were filed against her; she was excluded from squad meetings that
she was entitled to attend; a supervisor told Ms. Arnold that if she considered filing a discrimination
suit against the city, her job and that of her husband would be in jeopardy; after Ms. Arnold's son was
arrested and detained in jail, a lieutenant advised her that the incident was pure harassment; other
officers parked Ms. Arnold's vehicle with the keys locked inside or within inches of another car so that
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Thus, the courts appear to be well sensitized to the fact that reliance on
private, gender-based disparagement or displays of pornography is improper
under current doctrine. Still, these cases point to a need for the EEOC to
distinguish expressly between genuinely private workplace expression and ex-
pression to which other employees are captive. Such an addition to the current
Guidelines would ensure that equality of opportunity in the workplace can be
promoted at the least possible expense to employees' free speech rights.
B. THE INTERPERSONAL CONTEXT OF THE WORKPLACE
Another factor that influences the First Amendment analysis of hostile environ-
ment harassing speech is the interpersonal context, or power hierarchy, of the
workplace. The power disparity between harasser and targeted worker contrib-
utes to the worker's captivity and restricts her freedom to respond. In many
situations, the woman worker knows that she must choose between listening in
silence or responding and risking some adverse action by her employer. "Women
and minorities often use the same word to describe individuals who confront...
their bosses [about discrimination]-unemployed." 1
65
This problem is exacerbated by the power structure of most workplaces,
which continues to be largely sex-segregated. Although women now constitute
nearly half of the U.S. workforce, 166 their relatively recent entry into many
fields means that most of them hold jobs that fall in the low range of the
professional hierarchy, 167 with men occupying the vast majority of supervisory
and managerial positions. 168 For example, in March 1995, the Federal Glass
it was impossible to open the door on the driver's side, rolled down her windows when it rained so the
seats got wet, and once placed a dead, coiled snake in her police car; a memorandum was circulated to
Ms. Arnold advising her that male officers would give up their compensation time to keep her from
working; an officer pushed her across the room, knocking her into a file cabinet and bruising her; a
coworker drew a face on a punching bag in the office exercise room with the words, "Mona hit me,
hate me," and on another wrote, "Mona love me," and a lieutenant commented, "That's all women
officers are good for"; coworkers removed her name from her mail shelf; and coworkers shoved a
two-inch plug down the barrel of her shotgun. Id. at 865-66.
Finally, when officers Priscilla Kelsey-Andrews and Debra Conn sued the Philadelphia Police
Department, they demonstrated that, in addition to the pictures of naked women displayed on a locker
door that was usually open, women were referred to as "bitches," "cunts," "whores," and "bimbos";
photographs of women were placed in the drawer of a desk used by women officers; Ms. Andrews'
uniform was coated with calcium oxide, and when she took it out of her police locker and put it on, she
sustained skin injuries and had to be taken to a medical clinic for treatment; someone spit on Ms.
Conn's coat and cut the band off her hat; and Ms. Andrews received anonymous harassing phone calls
at her unlisted number. Kelsey-Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, No. 88-4101, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14476, at *3-12 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1988), vacated in part, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
165. Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. and the National
Council of Jewish Women at 24, filed in support of Petitioner, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
367 (1993) (No. 92-1168).
166. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED
STATES 396 (1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
167. Abrams, supra note 28, at 1204; Taub, supra note 28, at 346.
168. In addition to being severely underrepresented in managerial positions, women continue to be
relegated to traditional "pink collar" jobs. For example, in 1972 women represented 99.1% of all
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Ceiling Commission reported that although women make up 45.7% of the U.S.
workforce, 97% of senior managers at the Fortune 1000 industrial corporations
are white men, and only 5% of the top managers at Fortune 2000 industrial and
service companies are women. 169 The picture is similar outside of the business
community. A 1991 National Law Journal survey showed that women consti-
tuted 37% of the associates at the 250 largest U.S. law firms but only 11 % of the
partners. 170 The lower status of most women workers leads them to perceive
their own position in the workplace as marginal or precarious, 17' making them
especially reluctant to take employment-related risks.
Modem First Amendment jurisprudence has recognized that the power hierar-
chy present in the workplace justifies some regulation of management speech to
ensure the adequate protection of workers' rights. Professor Browne admits that
the Court "has endorsed a higher degree of regulation of speech in the work-
place in limited situations," but he does not explore whether the special
characteristics of the workplace justify restrictions on hostile environment
harassing speech.17 2 Instead, he summarily concludes that there is no "general
governmental right to regulate speech in the workplace"; the government may
limit certain forms of coercive speech to protect its interest in economic
regulation, but harassing speech is not one of them. 173 Professor Volokh con-
ducts an even more limited analysis, concluding that the Court treats workplace
speech differently only if it falls within what he dubs the "threat-or-promise"
exception: "both employees and employers have [full] First Amendment rights
in the workplace, so long as the communications do not contain a threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 174
Neither commentator's conclusion is correct, as demonstrated by the regula-
tion of workplace speech that the Court upheld in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 175
secretaries. ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2d ed. 1994).
In 1990, the percentage remained virtually the same-99%. Id. During the same time period, women
went from 97.6% of all registered nurses to 94.5%. Id. (quoting BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBOOK, BULLETIN 2385, at 43 (1991)). During the six-year
period from 1983 to 1988, the number of women working in the traditionally male construction
industry remained at a steady 2%. Id. And according to 1994 census data, women constitute only 3.9%
of airplane pilots and navigators; 8.6% of engineers; 18.6% of architects; and just over 20% of lawyers
and doctors. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 166, at 407-09.
The persistence of gender segregation in the marketplace and the painfully slow rate at which women
are infiltrating nontraditional areas of employment have contributed to the problem of gender-based
harassment. Studies have shown that women in male-dominated occupations are harassed more
frequently. Edward Lafontaine & Leslie Tredeau, The Frequency, Sources and Correlates of Sexual
Harassment Among Women in Traditional Male Occupations, 15 SEX ROLES 433, 436 (1986).
169. Walsh, supra note 19, at HI.
170. Terry Pristin, Firms Wake up to the Problem of Sex Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1994, at
B18.
171. Abrams, supra note 28, at 1204-05.
172. Browne, supra note 8, at 513.
173. Id. at 513-14.
174. Volokh, supra note 8, at 1821 (footnotes omitted).
175. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
430 [Vol. 84:399
RUNNING THE GAUNTLET OF HARASSING SPEECH
During a union organizing drive, the company president stated that the company
might close the plant in question if local workers elected the union and
subsequently called a strike. The union lost the election and filed charges of
unfair labor practices with the National Labor Relations Board. The Board
deemed the employer's statement an unfair labor practice and set aside the
election, ordering the company to bargain with the union. The company ap-
pealed, arguing that the finding violated its First Amendment free speech rights.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the coercive power
hierarchy inherent in the workplace justified limited restriction of an employer's
speech. As the Court put it:
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must
be made in the context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an employer's
rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely
... [a]nd any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic
dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency
of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of
the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.' 76
The Court thus held that limitations on an employer's freedom of expression
are constitutionally permissible even when they extend beyond a quid pro quo
scenario. Gissel Packing's president made no direct threat to close the plant or
pursue other forms of economic reprisal if its employees voted in the union; his
statements were explicitly predicated on the possibility of a future union
decision to strike.' 77 Specifically, the Court stated that during a union election
drive, any employer predictions as to the effects of unionization on a company
"must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employ-
er's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control." 78
Accordingly, "[c]onveyance of the employer's belief, even though sincere, that
unionization will. or may result in the closing of the plant is not a statement of
fact unless, which is most improbable, the eventuality of closing is capable of
proof." 179
In a similar case, the Court held that an employer had unfairly interfered with
a union election when, on the eve of the vote, it wrote a letter to its workers
promising substantial new benefits: "The union can't put any of those ...
[benefits] in your envelope--only the Company can do that." ' 80 In finding that
176. Id. at 617.
177. In addition, it was undisputed that the president's statements were honest expressions of his
opinion about the economic impact that a union-engineered strike would have on the company. The
Court's holding reflects its belief that, in a context of economic dependence, even factually correct
statements can be interpreted as threatening or coercive, and so may impermissibly interfere with
employees' rights.
178. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 618.
179. Id. at 618-19.
180. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409-10 & n.3 (1964).
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the promise of benefits violated the National Labor Relations Act, the Court
emphasized the contextual power hierarchy of the workplace:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a
fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that
the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future
benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.' 8 '
Although the Gissel Packing and Exchange Parts cases do not convert the
workplace into an enclave where the First Amendment does not apply, they
recognize that free speech analysis must be sensitive to the coercive interper-
sonal context that exists on the job. 182 This context deserves similar recognition
in the case of unwelcome gender-based harassing speech.1 83 As Professor
Balkin has suggested, "Certainly, if employer-employee relations involve suffi-
cient coercion that we can justify regulation in other contexts, then this coercion
does not suddenly vanish when the issue is submission to racist or sexist
speech."' 84 His point is well illustrated by a study that showed that 24% of
victims surveyed were fired because they complained about sexual harass-
ment. '85
Other studies also support the theory that the coercive environment of the
workplace makes most women reluctant to confront their harassers directly. An
analysis of ten studies of sexual harassment in the workplace showed that a
median of 41% of harassment victims responded by avoiding or ignoring it, and
an additional 24% tried to defuse the situation through indirect strategies such
as joking or stalling. Twenty-three percent used some form of negotiation, such
as requesting that the harasser stop. Only 10% responded with confrontation,
including telling the harasser to stop or making a formal complaint. ' 8
6
In sum, both the physical and the interpersonal contexts of the workplace
create special pressures on women workers, making them captive to harassers'
hostile and abusive speech. Here, as in other situations recognized by the courts,
181. Id. at 409.
182. Commentators have noted that the Gissel Court clearly distinguished the workplace election
setting from that of political elections for purposes of First Amendment analysis. Sangree, supra note 7,
at 541.
183. The fighting words doctrine is another example of First Amendment theory that turns on the
importance of "interpersonal context." The narrowly limited doctrine permits regulation of expression
in a context in which it has "a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom,
individually [it is] addressed." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942); see also
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
184. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amend-
ment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 424.
185. WWI, A PROFILE, supra note 23.
186. James Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment: A Literature Review, 74 SOCIOL. &
SOCIAL REs. 3, 5 (1989). A recent survey conducted by Working Woman magazine showed that the most
common tactic, used by 46% of women victims, is trying to ignore the problem. Among those who had
been harassed, 40% told the harasser to stop and only 26% reported the harassment. Ronni Sandroff,
Sexual Harassment: The Inside Story, WORKING WOMAN, June 1992, at 50.
[Vol. 84:399
RUNNING THE GAUNTLET OF HARASSING SPEECH
the context in which the speech occurs reduces the strength of First Amendment
protections.
C. VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY AND HARASSING SPEECH
One could argue, as do Professors Browne and Volokh, that the deference
given to context in First Amendment jurisprudence is never sufficient to overcome
the requirement that restrictions on expression be viewpoint neutral.1 87 The
argument against viewpoint-based regulation of speech is that it invites abusive
enforcement by allowing officials to censor only expression critical of the state
and thus distort the marketplace of ideas. Courts and commentators frequently
articulate the principle that viewpoint-discriminatory regulations of expression
are more constitutionally suspect than those that are viewpoint neutral. 1
88
I agree with Professors Browne and Volokh that Title VII's restrictions on
hostile environment harassment are viewpoint discriminatory.18 9 The law prohib-
its expression only if it voices the view that women and men should be treated
differently. As Professor Volokh puts it:
One person in the lunch room may speak eloquently and loudly about how
women are equal to men, and harassment law will not stop him. But when
another tries to respond that women are inferior-belong in the home, are
unreliable during their menstrual periods, or should not be allowed on the
police force-harassment law steps in. 190
By restricting expression of only one point of view, the law does exactly what
the viewpoint-neutrality requirement was designed to prevent: it distorts the
underlying debate on the issue of gender equality. 19'
Despite its repeated endorsements of the viewpoint-neutrality principle, how-
187. Browne, supra note 8, at 518-19, 521-25; Volokh, supra note 8, at 1840-43, passim.
188. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976) (stating that state's
"regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being
expressed by the communicator").
189. The restrictions also are content discriminatory. Workplace harassment law only regulates
speech related to certain subjects, such as gender, race, or religion, and not others, such as hair color or
weight. The focus of First Amendment jurisprudence has shifted from a prohibition on content
discrimination, in which a regulation authorizes differential treatment based on the subject matter of
speech, to a prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, in which a regulation allows expression of a
particular viewpoint on a subject while allowing related, rival ideas to go unrestricted. For a thorough
analysis of this shift in emphasis, see Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content
Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982).
190. Volokh, supra note 8, at 1854-55.
191. Professor Sangree asserts that even an employment discrimination law targeted exclusively at
conduct, rather than speech, would not be viewpoint neutral. Sangree, supra note 7, at 522-28. By
definition, gender-based discriminatory conduct expresses, directly or indirectly, the message that the
actor or speaker believes the target worker is different and inferior, either because women are not good
workers, because women should remain in the home, or because women exist only as sexual toys for
men's pleasure. Professor Sangree argues that if hostile environment harassment law is a constitution-
ally impermissible restriction on speech, then so must be the entirety of employment discrimination
law. See Sangree, supra note 7, at 465, 557-58.
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ever, the Court has occasionally departed from it. In applying the captive
audience doctrine, for example, the Court has approved several restrictions on
expression that are viewpoint discriminatory. In Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc.,192 the Court upheld portions of an injunction that prohibited
antiabortion protestors from entering a thirty-six foot buffer zone around a
clinic's entrances and driveway. The injunction was directed solely at the
expression of antiabortion protestors, and it placed no restrictions on potential
speech by prochoice activists.19 3 In Rowan v. United States Post Office Depart-
ment,194 the Court upheld a statute that allowed the Postal Service to prohibit
mailers from sending an individual resident advertisements that, "in his sole
discretion[, he] believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative." 195
The statute did not permit similar restrictions on advertisements that promoted a
different view-sexual puritanism, for example--or those that were neutral on
the subject of sex. 19 6 The Court's restrictions on employers' antiunion speech
have been similarly viewpoint based, placing no parallel restrictions on the
expression of prounion sentiments. 197
There are powerful reasons to demand viewpoint neutrality in the regulation
of expression. But as with any doctrine, situations exist in which those reasons
diminish. Workplace harassment law is one of them, in part because the captive
nature of the victim and the coercive power of the harasser contribute to the
That discriminatory conduct has an expressive component, however, does not necessarily convert
regulation of such conduct into a free speech issue. All action is based on and reflects, to some extent,
the expression of an idea held by the actor. If the First Amendment bars the regulation of all action that
might contain. a kernel of expression, we would be paralyzed from enacting legislation and this
overbroad interpretation would render the First Amendment meaningless.
In many situations, the line between expression and conduct may be difficult to draw. A large
universe of expressive conduct, such as participating in a civil rights demonstration or burning a flag,
contains significant elements of both. But generally it is possible to differentiate between the two. A
thief who breaks into a home does so for a reason; although that reason could be cast in free speech
terms, we punish him because he did more than simply express an idea (for example, that the rich
should share their wealth with the poor)-he acted on it. Similarly, firing a woman worker involves
some action-the termination itself-even if it is accomplished through words ("You're fired because
women can't do this job."). A coworker's statement about the inferiority of women workers ("I hate
working with you because women can't do this job."), in contrast, is speech, pure and simple. No
action has been-taken, and there is no conclusive result.
192. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
193. Id. at 2521-22. The majority disingenuously described the injunction as viewpoint neutral, on
the ground that an injunction, "by its very nature, applies only to a particular group (or individual) and
regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of that group. It does so, however, because of the
group's past actions in the context of a specific dispute between real parties." Id. at 2523.
194. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
195. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
196. That the speech at issue was sexual may well have been outcome-determinative. The Court has
a long history of according lesser protection to sexual speech. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560 (1991) (finding statute requiring "exotic" dancers to wear pasties and a G-string did not
violate First Amendment); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (commenting
that society's interest in protecting sexual speech "is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than
the interest in untrammeled political debate").
197. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375
U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
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strength of the government's interest in preventing workplace harassment. As
demonstrated in Part IV of this article, the compelling nature of this interest and
the narrow tailoring of existing restrictions on harassing speech combine to
demonstrate that the law survives First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis.
IV. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT LAW AND FIRST AMENDMENT
STRICT SCRUTINY
The restrictive physical context and coercive interpersonal context of the
workplace magnify the harm inflicted by hostile environment harassing speech.
As discussed below, the government's interest in preventing this harm is
heightened by its constitutional mandate to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The best methodology for resolving
such a clash between freedom of expression and another fundamental interest is
application of the Court's "strict scrutiny" test, the most rigorous analysis
available under current First Amendment doctrine.
To survive strict scrutiny, a restriction on expression must pass a three-
pronged test. The restriction must be supported by a "compelling" government
interest; necessary to accomplish that interest; and narrowly tailored so that it
places the least possible burden on expression. 198 The test is considered so
demanding that if a restriction on expression survives strict scrutiny, it is
constitutionally permissible even if it is not viewpoint neutral.' 99
Professor Sangree does not subject hostile environment harassment law to
strict scrutiny analysis, 20° in part because she believes there is no conflict
between equality rights and free speech rights, and thus no need to balance the
two against each other. Sangree asserts that "[p]rohibiting [harassing] speech
enhances First Amendment free speech principles," and that therefore "it is
clear that the First Amendment is not harmed by hostile environment law."
20
'
Although she does not fully develop this argument, it appears to be based on the
premise that discriminatory speech silences its targets; if such speech is elimi-
nated, members of targeted groups will be more free to express themselves.
Therefore, while hostile environment harassment law suppresses some instances
of harassers' discriminatory speech, it simultaneously promotes the speech of
198. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). One of
the two district courts to rule on a free speech challenge to Title VII has indicated that the statute's
prohibition on hostile environment harassment survives strict scrutiny. See Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that Title VII's prohibition on
gender discrimination in workplace constitutes "compelling" state interest within meaning of First
Amendment strict scrutiny).
199. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117
(1991).
200. Professor Sangree asserts that the government's interest in "[e]radicating sex discrimination
from employment is an interest recognized ... to be highly important if not compelling." Sangree,
supra note 7, at 554. In the context of strict scrutiny, this distinction is a fundamental one, because a
"compelling" interest is sufficient to pass the test, while an "important" one is not.
201. Id. at 481,559.
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those who were previously silenced. On the whole, the amount of speech will
remain constant or even increase.
Arguments like Professor Sangree's have been advanced in the hate speech
debate, and they have a strong appeal. But this approach to the First Amend-
ment is risky and controversial. The courts have never interpreted the Free
Speech Clause to provide a collective right to maximize the total amount of
expression that occurs in our society. Instead, the Clause has long been viewed
as a source of individual liberty, a guarantee that every individual person has a
right to express herself. Accordingly, promoting the speech of one group
(targets of workplace harassment) at the expense of silencing another (harass-
ers) is antithetical to traditional First Amendment doctrine. Before we can
embark on such a new approach to First Amendment jurisprudence, we must
decide whether equality is a precondition for free speech, or free speech is a
precondition for equality.20 2
Resolution of this expansive debate is not necessary to settle the narrower
controversy over the constitutionality of workplace harassment law. The rela-
tively small scope of hostile environment harassment restrictions makes them
particularly amenable to traditional First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis.
A. THE COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST BEHIND WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT LAW
Although Professors Browne and Volokh each discuss interests that may be
balanced against free speech in workplace harassment cases,2 °3 neither of them
actually performs a strict scrutiny analysis. By focusing on the Free Speech
Clause as the only constitutional dimension to the hostile environment harass-
ment debate, they fail to see that the Equal Protection Clause weighs in on the
other side of the scale. 2°
1. The Equal Protection Clause as a Source of the Government's Compelling
Interest
The conflict between harassers' freedom of expression and workers' equality
of opportunity boils down to a clash between two constitutional amendments:
202. For an overview of the contours of this debate, see Lawrence, supra note 14 (arguing that
equality is a precondition for freedom of expression); Matsuda, supra note 14 (same); Strossen, supra
note 113 (arguing that equality and freedom of expression have a "symbiotic relationship," and citing
others who claim liberty is "more basic" than equality).
203. Browne, supra note 8, at 541-42, 543 (referring to interest underlying harassment law as
"eliminating prejudice" and "decreasing the amount of offense suffered"); Volokh, supra note 8, at
1807-09 (referring to interests underlying harassment law as preventing "harrowing abuse," which
"interferes with [workers'] ability to make a living, and creates barriers for them that others ... do not
have to overcome").
204. See Susan Deller Ross, Today's Sexy Issue: Sexual Harassment Law and the First Amendment,
in SPEECH AND EQUALITY: Do WE HAVE TO CHOOSE? (Gora La Marche ed., 1995).
Professor Sangree notes that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII, was enacted pursuant
to Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause as well as its
Commerce Clause power, but she does not explore the issue further. See Sangree, supra note 7, at 554.
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the First and the Fourteenth. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause is triggered because Congress expressly enacted Title VII based not only
its Commerce Clause authority, but also on its Fourteenth Amendment, Section
5 authority "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the [Four-
teenth Amendment]." 20 5 One of these provisions is the Equal Protection
Clause.2 °6
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,2 °7 the Court recognized
Congress's intent to enact the 1964 Civil Rights Act pursuant to its power under
the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its Commerce Clause power. Because the
Court found that the Act was properly supported by the government's Com-
merce Clause power, it never reached the question of whether Congress was
correct in determining that the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of enforcement
authority could have served as an independent and sufficient basis for the law.
Justices Douglas and Goldberg each wrote separately, however, to make clear
that if the question had been addressed, the answer would have been a resound-
ing "yes.''20 Title VII's restrictions on gender-based workplace harassment
therefore are supported by one of the most compelling interests conceivable-
the government's interest in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to enforce the
dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
2. Policy and Doctrinal Support for the Government's Compelling Interest
Strong policy reasons provide further support for the compelling nature of the
government interest in restricting discriminatory workplace expression. As
Justice Goldberg noted in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Congress's primary purpose
in passing the 1964 Civil Rights Act was "the vindication of human dignity.",
209
Gender-based verbal harassment assaults the dignity of a female worker in
many ways: by adversely affecting her work environment while leaving her
205. The legislative history of the Act expressly states that Congress enacted it on two bases, the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964); see also id. at 286-91 (appendix to opinion of Douglas, J.,
concurring, setting forth relevant excerpts from legislative history).
206. The Senator who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate described Section 5 as a
"direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress," and stated that it "casts upon Congress the
responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out in
good faith.... It enables Congress, in case the States shall enact laws in conflict with the principles of
the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional enactment." Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,649 n.8 (1966) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766, 2768 (1866)).
207. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
208. Id. at 281-86 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring). As a practical
matter, it is highly unlikely that this issue will ever reach the Court. Because Congress's Commerce
Clause power was sufficient to support the 1964 Act, there is no need to consider the same question in
light of its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power. But the Court's recent affirmative action opinion,
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), indicates that if confronted with the
issue, a majority of the current Justices would support the Douglas-Goldberg position. See Ross, supra
note 204 (arguing that at least five current Justices may support a broad interpretation of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power).
209. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 377 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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male counterparts free of similar obstacles; by encouraging men to treat her as a
sex object, which typically undermines her efforts to function in a different role;
by harming her psychological and physical well-being; and, at its worst, by
excluding her from the workplace entirely. 2t ° This form of employment discrimi-
nation, like other forms, harms female employees by creating substantial ob-
stacles to their self-fulfillment and harms society as a whole by depriving it of
the full contribution that each individual can make.2" The government's interest
in reducing or eliminating such harm is therefore a profound one, and no bold
expansion of existing doctrine is needed to find it "compelling" within the
meaning of the strict scrutiny test. In closely related contexts, the Court
repeatedly has recognized that the elimination of gender-based marketplace
discrimination is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify limited restrictions
on competing First Amendment rights.21 2
a. The All-Male Club Cases. Roberts v. United States Jaycees213 involved a
First Amendment free association challenge brought by the Jaycees, a charitable
organization, in defense of their male-only membership policy. When two local
chapters began to admit women as full-fledged members, the national organiza-
tion threatened to revoke their charters.2t4 In response, the local chapters filed
charges of discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights,
alleging that the national organization's policy constituted gender discrimina-
tion in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). 215 The
national organization filed suit in federal court, claiming that application of the
MHRA to the Jaycees' membership policy would violate male members' consti-
tutional right to freedom of expressive association. The Supreme Court dis-
agreed and held that the restrictions imposed by the MHRA survive constitutional
scrutiny:
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not ... absolute. Infringe-
ments on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compel-
ling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational free-
doms. We are persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application
210. See supra text accompanying notes 15-38.
211. See Taub, supra note 28, at 346.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 213-29.
213. 468 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1984).
214. Id. at 614.
215. Id. at 614-15. The MHRA provides, in relevant part:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice: to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public
accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, marital
status, sexual orientation, or sex ....
MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982). The Jaycees organization is a "place of public accommodation"
within the meaning of the MHRA. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616.
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of the statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associational
freedoms.
216
The Court further stated that "the importance, both to the individual and to
society, of removing the barriers to economic advancement and political and
social integration that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups,
including women," constitutes a compelling government interest.2 17 "[A]cts of
invidious discrimination ... cause unique evils that government has a compel-
ling interest to prevent .... ,2 8The Court has reaffirmed this holding in two
similar cases involving freedom of expressive association challenges to local
laws against all-male private clubs in California and New York.2t 9
These cases are not precisely analogous to those involving hostile environ-
ment harassing speech for two reasons. First, the all-male club cases focus on
freedom of expressive association, 220 rather than freedom of expression itself.
But this distinction is not a significant one. Courts and commentators uniformly
have conceptualized freedom of expressive association as a privilege implicit in
the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. 22 The theory is that an individu-
al's fight to express her views may not be sufficiently protected from the
potentially powerful machinery of government censorship unless she has a
216. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 626.
218. Id. at 628; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976) (stating that "while
invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising ... First Amendment
[freedoms] ... it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections").
219. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that club's
male-only membership policy violated California public accommodation law, on ground that state had a
"compelling" interest in ensuring that women obtain equal access to the acquisition of leadership skills
and business contacts); see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (reaffirming "power of states to pursue the profoundly important goal of
ensuring nondiscriminatory access to commercial opportunities in our society") (quoting Roberts, 468
U.S. at 632).
It is worth noting that in the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection context, the Court has treated
gender-based classifications as less important than those that are race-based, by subjecting them to
intermediate (rather than strict) scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny requires that a particular law serve an
"important," rather than a "compelling," government interest. But as Justice Ginsburg noted in Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 373 (1993), and Justice O'Connor indicated in Mississippi Univ. of
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982), the Court has expressly left open the ultimate question
of whether strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard. Numerous women's groups recently joined
together to file an amicus brief urging the Court to resolve this issue in favor of strict scrutiny. Brief for
Amicus Curiae, National Women's Law Center, American Civil Liberties Union et al., at 4-30, United
States v. Virginia (No. 94-1941) (1995).
220. The Court has recognized two distinct types of "freedom of association." First, the right to
freedom of expressive association is guaranteed by the Constitution as an indispensable means of
preserving individual freedom of expression and is derived directly from the Free Speech Clause. See
infra text accompanying notes 221-22.
Second, the Court has held that the Constitution protects from state intrusion certain personal choices
to enter into and maintain intimate relationships. This freedom of intimate association is a fundamental
component of personal liberty, separate and distinct from freedom of expression. It is the case law
developed under the first type of free association that is relevant to Title VII free speech issues.
221. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
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corresponding right to associate with others who have similar views.2 22 Because
expression and expressive association are two sides of the same coin, an interest
that is sufficiently compelling to permit regulation of expression in the free
association context ought to be sufficiently compelling in the free speech
context as well. 2 3 The underlying reasoning of the Roberts line of cases
therefore should apply in the hostile environment harassment context. One of
the two district courts to consider a First Amendment challenge to Title VII's
hostile environment harassment restrictions agreed, holding that the state's
interest in eliminating workplace "impediments to the equality of women" is
sufficiently "compelling" to justify the regulation of discriminatory speech. 24
A second possible flaw in the analogy is that the result reached in the all-male
club cases may have been driven by the frailty of club members' First Amend-
ment interests, rather than by the strength of the government's interest in gender
equality. In theory, the Court should have determined whether the government's
interest was strong enough to be "compelling" (and thus survive strict scrutiny)
on an independent basis, without considering the relative strength of the club
members' competing First Amendment interests. But it is not clear that the
Court did so. The First Amendment interest in the private club cases was
relatively weak. In Roberts, for example, the Jaycees already had allowed
women to participate in many of its training and community activities.2 2 5 This
history of de facto integration, in conjunction with the club's failure to demon-
strate any relationship between their discriminatory membership policies and
any organizational advocacy of political ideas, substantially detracted from the
male members' argument that they could only express themselves fully by
excluding women from formal membership. The relative weakness of the First
Amendment interest here made it easier for the Court to weigh in on the side of
equality of opportunity.
It is possible that when faced with a situation in which equal opportunity
conflicts with more robust free speech rights, the Court may arrive at a different
result. But this is unlikely to occur in a hostile environment harassment case, in
which the First Amendment rights of harassers are relatively weak because their
speech arises in a special context-the workplace-where physical and interper-
sonal dimensions convert women into a captive audience subject to economic
226
coercion.
222. See, e.g., id. at 622.
223. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982).
224. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1991); see also
Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1439 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (invalidating
local government's ban on "sexually oriented" magazines in firehouse, but noting that "[t]here is no
doubt that the prevention of sexual harassment is a compelling government interest").
225. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609; see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1,
12 (1988) (finding that nonmembers regularly participated in meetings); Board of Directors of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987) ("Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are
carried on in the presence of strangers.... At some Rotary Clubs, the visitors number 'in the tens and
twenties each week.' ").
226. See supra text accompanying notes 124-86.
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b. The Pittsburgh Press Decision. Additional support for the government's
compelling interest in supporting workplace harassment law may be drawn
from the Court's holding in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations.2 27 A newspaper had violated a local human rights ordinance
by publishing help-wanted advertisements in two separate columns, one for
"male" jobs and another for "female" jobs. The Court rejected the newspaper's
free speech challenge to the ordinance and ordered it to discontinue its practice.
Pittsburgh Press is arguably distinguishable from hostile environment harass-
ment cases because it involved a restriction on commercial speech, which is
entitled to a lesser degree of First Amendment protection than are other forms of
expression. 22 8 Despite this distinction, the opinion stands for the general prin-
ciple that the government's interest in eliminating workplace gender discrimina-
229tion can be sufficiently important to justify some limitation on free expression.
c. Telephone Harassment Laws. Several courts also have held that the govern-
ment's interest in protecting targets from abusive speech over the telephone is
compelling. 230 Expression prohibited by telephone harassment statutes typically
includes the kind of speech that would constitute gender-specific abuse and
sexual harassment under hostile environment law.
23
'
Consider the recent, highly publicized example of Richard Berendzen, former
president of American University, who pleaded guilty to two charges of making
indecent telephone calls to a woman who had advertised her home daycare
services. The woman, who was married to a police officer, recorded the calls, in
which Berendzen "described in graphic detail how he and his wife had sex with
their children. He talked about his extensive collection of videotaped child
pornography and sometimes even insisted that he kept a 4-year-old Filipino girl
as a 'sex slave' in a basement dog cage.", 232 Berendzen often suggested that the
227. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
228. Id. at 385; see also Virginia State Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770-72 (1976).
229. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 391.
230. Lampley v. United States, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1978). In Lampley, the court upheld a
federal statute outlawing harassing telephone calls based on the government's compelling interest in
"the protection of innocent individuals from fear, abuse or annoyance at the hands of persons who
[engage in such speech] not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives." Id. The statute in
question prohibited any person from making an interstate telephone call in which he or she:
(A) makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, or indecent; (B) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, without
disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the
called number; (C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to
ring, with intent to harass any person at the called number; or (D) makes repeated telephone
calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number ....
47 U.S.C. § 223(1) (1995); see also Gormley v. Director, Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938,
940-41 (2d Cir.) (upholding state statute outlawing telephone harassment on basis of compelling state
interest), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 75-94.
232. Susan Deller Ross, Proving Sexual Harassment: The Hurdles, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1452
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woman put her two daughters, aged twelve and five, on the line so that he could
instruct them on how to perform sexual acts on their mother. He also boasted
that he used bizarre sadomasochistic tools to exert "tremendous discipline"
over his family. He said he sometimes strapped his wife to a wheel that he kept
in his basement. Berendzen sometimes told the woman that he was masturbat-
ing as he talked to her.233
Berendzen's statements are much like those made in workplace harassment
cases. Women employees often are forced to listen to their male coworkers
boast about their sexual prowess, detail the sexual acts they have performed and
fantasize about performing, and suggest what kinds of sexual activities the
target of their harassment would enjoy.2 34 If the govemment's interest in
restricting such speech is sufficiently compelling when it occurs over the phone,
it is even stronger when it occurs in the workplace. It is far more difficult to get
a new job than simply to hang up the telephone or get an unlisted number.
B. THE NECESSITY OF HARASSMENT LAW'S RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
Prevention of verbal harassment is necessary to eradicate employment discrimi-
nation because harassing speech inflicts substantial harm on its targets and
accounts for a large part of the differential, adverse treatment of women
employees.235 Professor Browne claims, however, that antiharassment laws
directed at speech are not necessary to prevent verbal harassment, because, "in
an age when racist and sexist sentiments are deemed in most circles to reflect
adversely on the speaker rather than the target, ... legal sanctions against racist
and sexist expression seem[] largely unnecessary."' 236 Yet the real-life examples
described in Part I of this article,237 all of which occurred within the past five to
ten years, make it painfully obvious that most harassers have not been embar-
rassed into silence.
In addition, studies show that most women are unable to stop or significantly
reduce sexual harassment without filing an antidiscrimination lawsuit. A survey
of female federal employees who attempted to put an end to unwanted sexual
harassment found that nothing short of legal action was particularly effective.
Only 29% of the women who ignored the harassment found that this lessened
the problem. Of those women who said they "went along with" it, only 16%
reported that this approach was effective. Even women who directly told their
harassers to stop found that this failed to improve the situation in 39% of cases,
and others found that threatening to tell or actually telling others about the
harassment was effective only about half of the time.238
(1992) (quoting B. Hewitt & G. Clifford, A University President Tumbles from Grace Following
Charges that He Made Obscene Phone Calls, PEOPLE MAG., May 14, 1990, at 54).
233. Id.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 39-54.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 22-38.
236. See Browne, supra note 8, at 544.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 39-54.
238. 1988 MSPB SURVEY, supra note 18, at 35.
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Finally, this problem cannot be resolved through reasoned debate. Because
women are captive in the workplace context, and because of the power disparity
between harassers and their targets, most women workers do not have a realistic
opportunity to counter harassment by engaging in speech supportive of women's
equality.2
39
C. THE NARROW TAILORING OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT LAW
A regulation is narrowly tailored within the meaning of First Amendment
strict scrutiny if it "targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the
'evil' it seeks to remedy." 2 40 It must regulate expression to the extent necessary
to prevent the fundamental harm of gender-based workplace discrimination-
and no more.
The question of whether current restrictions on hostile environment harassing
speech are sufficiently narrowly tailored is an extremely difficult one. Some
limits on the law's regulatory reach may be found in the five demanding proof
requirements for assertion of a hostile environment claim.2 4' Taken together,
these elements restrict the law's regulatory reach to the most extreme, persis-
tent, and unwelcome forms of workplace harassment. But perhaps the best way
to determine whether these limitations are sufficiently narrow is to consider the
alternatives. If a less speech-restrictive alternative exists that will still allow the
government to realize its compelling interest of eliminating gender-based work-
place discrimination, the current law cannot stand.242
Professor Volokh has proposed one less restrictive alternative: regulate only
discriminatory workplace speech that is directed at a particular individual, and
leave "undirected" expressions of gender-based intolerance unregulated.243
Volokh contends that "undirected" harassing speech "is a vital part of national
social and political debate," whereas "directed" speech "does not have this sort
of value; it is much less likely to convince or to edify, and more likely only to
offend.", 244 But this dichotomy is a false one. A woman may feel worse when
harassing speech is specifically directed at her; the statement, "You're a cunt,"
may be more emotionally painful to hear than, "All women are cunts." It would
be difficult to argue, however, that only the latter statement is a vital part of a
national political debate, or that it is more likely than the former to convince
and edify the listener.
Moreover, undirected harassment, aimed at women as a group, results in the
same fundamental harm as directed harassment: the creation of adverse employ-
239. See supra text accompanying notes 165-70.
240. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 76-94.
242. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 527 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (finding ordinance unconstitutional because it served as total ban and less restrictive
alternative was available).
243. See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1846-47.
244. Id. at 1798.
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ment conditions imposed only on women. Consider a factory floor that is
decorated with signs bearing slogans such as, "It takes a man to do the job" and
"A woman's place is on her back," and with posters of naked women in
sexually provocative positions over the caption, "Now she deserves a raise."
None of this expression is directed at a particular woman worker, but it creates a
profoundly inhospitable environment for all women, in direct contrast to their
male coworkers. A narrowing of the law to insulate such speech from regulation
would eviscerate the government's ability to ensure equal opportunity in the
workplace.245 The First Amendment does not require this result.
A second, potentially less restrictive alternative is to create a "free speech
zone" at every worksite, a designated space where vigorous debate on issues of
gender equality is encouraged.246 Within these zones, workers and management
would be permitted to say or post anything they choose, with no risk of liability
or retaliation. This concept is laudable because it promotes "more speech" over
regulation, but its viability is dubious. Several studies demonstrate that most
women victims of workplace harassment are extremely reluctant to confront
harassing speech.2 47 It is unlikely that this reluctance will evaporate simply
because an employer promises that no retaliation will occur on the basis of
statements made in a protected zone. Any employee will realize that this
guarantee will be difficult to enforce. In most cases, a low-level worker cannot
realistically rely on her supervisor to separate conscientiously those statements
she makes in a "free speech zone" from those she makes outside of it. How can
she be sure that she will not somehow be punished on the job for talking back to
her supervisor within the zone, particularly if the debate occurs in front of other
workers who cheer her on and embarrass him?
An even larger problem is that most instances of harassing speech are not
designed to communicate and therefore are difficult to respond to even absent
any fear of retribution. Professor Browne suggests that the "only effective
method" for reducing discriminatory workplace speech "is to provide a persua-
sive response-that is 'more speech,' " and adds that " 'Shut up!' is not a
persuasive response. ' ' 248 But Browne fails to explore how a persuasive response
can occur within the workplace hierarchy. What kind of rational rejoinder could
Flora Villalobos have made to her boss's comment, "You have such a fine ass.
245. Both district courts that have addressed the First Amendment implications of Title VII's hostile
environment restrictions have rejected the directed versus undirected distinction for this reason. See
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
246. In the particular context of the Robinson case, the ACLU supported this kind of approach as an
initial step to be taken prior to suppressing speech. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc. and American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. at 21-22,
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. (11 th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-3655); see also Strossen, supra note
8, at 771-72.
247. See supra text accompanying note 186.
248. Browne, supra note 8, at 550.
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It's a nice ass to stick a nice dick into. How may dicks have you eaten?" 249
What could Teresa Harris have said in response to her boss calling her a "dumb
ass woman?" Should she deny the accusation? Hurl derogatory names back at
him, even though he controlled her day-to-day job responsibilities? How should
Ms. Harris have engaged him in debate over his view that women subordinates
should dress in a way that exposed their breasts? And what about Patty Baxter,
whose coworkers called her a "cavern cunt?",250 As Professor Lawrence has
eloquently stated in the analogous context of racist speech, "Assaultive racist
speech functions as a preemptive strike. The racial invective is experienced as a
blow, not a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that
dialogue will follow."
25
'
Moreover, free speech zones are based on a First Amendment concept that
seems inapplicable to hostile environment harassment-the free marketplace of
ideas. This theory posits that for society to winnow truth from falsehood, all
ideas must be aired and tested against each other in open competition, and
eventually the truth will prevail.252 But the workplace is not a free market of
expression. The power dynamic that exists on the job silences victims of
harassment, distorting the debate and making a laissez-faire approach highly
problematic.
It also is far from clear that the marketplace of ideas metaphor is a useful
construct for dealing with sexist speech in any context. The theory presupposes
that people act entirely rationally, sifting through the universe of available ideas
in an attempt to find the truth. In fact, however, no evidence exists to support
the view that people function this way when prejudiced belief systems are
involved.253 Even unconscious gender-based prejudices may dictate what infor-
mation a person pays attention to and what he or she discounts or ignores.254
The many critics of current hostile environment harassment law have failed
to propose other alternatives. Although both of the above-described proposals
would lessen restrictions on expression, they fail to meet the Supreme Court's
249. EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1508 (9th Cir. 1989).
250. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988).
251. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 452.
252. In the words of Justice Brandeis, "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of [a] thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market. ); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1966) (arguing that more speech is best process for promoting knowledge and truth).
253. See David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 469-70 (1987).
Of course, it may be that even a defective marketplace of ideas constitutes a better path toward truth
than one distorted by government censorship. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 28 ("Truth is more likely to
prevail even in an imperfect market than under a system of government censorship.").
254. See Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate,
42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1286 (1995).
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requirement of being practicable or effective, because they will result in a
substantial drop in equal employment opportunities for women. Although Title
VII's hostile environment restrictions may be far from perfect, they represent
the best possible balance between these two fundamental rights that has been
proposed thus far.
V. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSING SPEECH AND THE DANGERS OF THE
SECONDARY EFFECTS DOCTRINE
Five of the current Supreme Court Justices have indicated that, if faced with a
free speech challenge to workplace harassment law, they would make an end
run around the rigorous strict scrutiny test and instead would uphold the law
pursuant to the First Amendment "secondary effects" doctrine.255 As discussed
below, such a strategy is unwise, primarily because the parameters of this
recently developed doctrine are poorly defined and therefore highly susceptible
to legislative manipulation. The resulting potential for unwarranted suppression
of speech pursuant to this doctrine has thus far been limited because its reach
has been restricted to sexually explicit speech. Its extension to cover the wide
range of expression that may contribute to a hostile work environment would
substantially increase the government's censorship power.
The secondary effects doctrine draws a constitutional distinction between
laws that regulate primary versus secondary effects of expression. "Primary
effects" are those specifically related to the ideas that speech conveys: in other
words, the emotional, intellectual, or physical response of the listener. A statute
that prohibits all expression that its audience finds offensive, for example, is
aimed at a primary effect of speech and therefore cannot be upheld pursuant to
this doctrine. "Secondary effects," in contrast, are not related to the content of
speech; they may include the disturbance of a neighborhood caused by high
decibel-level expression, or an increase in litter resulting from pamphleting. If a
government regulation focuses on a secondary effect of expression, it may
restrict speech that is "merely incidental" to that focus. 256 The doctrine does
not require that such a regulation be supported by a compelling government
interest; any interest other than censorship is enough, regardless of its degree of
significance.257 A law targeted at a secondary effect of speech may even have a
viewpoint-discriminatory impact on expression that is "swept up incidentally"
within its reach. 8
For example, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,259 the Court upheld
a municipal zoning ordinance that regulated the location of adult movie the-
255. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390-91 (1992); see also infra text accompanying
notes 264-65.
256. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1987) (plurality opinion); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,46 (1986).
257. See R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 389-90.
258. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
259. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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aters.260 The Court recognized that this restriction lacked viewpoint neutrality
because it treated theaters specializing in adult films differently than other types
of movie houses. Nevertheless, it upheld the ordinance on the grounds that the
city council's intent was "unrelated to the suppression of free expression," and
that the ordinance was not aimed at the "content of the films shown at 'adult
motion picture theaters.' ,,261 Instead, the Court found that the council's purpose
was to eliminate the "secondary effects" created by adult theaters, such as the
spread of crime, the devaluation of property, and the deterioration of the quality
of residential neighborhoods, commercial districts, and urban life in general.262
Similarly, one could argue that hostile environment restrictions focus on a
secondary effect of harassing speech-that of employment discrimination. Pro-
fessor Volokh is incorrect when he asserts that the law turns on primary effects
such as "the emotive impact" of harassing workplace speech and the prevention
of "psychological damage to the targets" of harassment.263 Although these
effects can be important elements of a hostile environment claim, even the most
brutally abusive harassment would not violate Title VII on that basis alone. It is
only when speech results in the creation of an adverse environment for mem-
bers of a single gender, in other words, when it has the secondary effect of
employment discrimination, that liability is triggered.
In recent dicta, a majority of the Court cited Title VII as an example of a
permissible restriction on speech pursuant to the secondary effects doctrine. 264
260. Specifically, the ordinance dictated that movie theaters specializing in "adult motion pictures"
could not be located within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling,
church, park, or school. Id. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 47, 48 (emphasis omitted).
262. Id. at 47. The ordinance's "dubious legislative history belie[s] the Court's conclusion that the
city's pursuit of its zoning interests ... was unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Id. at 57(Brennan, J., dissenting). It was only after two adult movie theaters challenged the ordinance on First
Amendment grounds that the city council amended the ordinance to state that its intent was to regulate
the secondary effects of this type of expression. Id. at 59. The Court simply accepted the city's post hoc
rationalization at face value and ignored evidence that the ordinance was a response to the content of
the regulated expression.
263. Volokh, supra note 8, at 1826-27; see also Browne, supra note 8, at 521-25 (criticizing
primary-secondary effects distinction). Professor Sangree conflates the issue of viewpoint neutrality
with that of secondary effects. Although she asserts her agreement with Professors Browne and Volokh
that harassment law regulates only the primary effects of speech, she later argues that harassment law is
viewpoint neutral because it "does not target [any] viewpoint directly," but only targets words "when
they operate to bar or burden a person's employment"-in other words, when they have a secondary
effect. Sangree, supra note 7, at 510-11, 523-24. This argument is similar to one articulated by
Professor Marcy Strauss. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 38-41 (arguing that discriminatory speech can be
prohibited when it causes women tangible harm).
264. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 390-91; see also Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89(D. Minn. 1993) ("[T]itle VII may legitimately proscribe conduct, including undirected expressions of
gender intolerance, which creates an offensive working environment. That expression is 'swept up' in
this proscription does not violate First Amendment principles."). The Court also has held that the
congressional purpose underlying Title VII was to accomplish a goal independent of expression-the
elimination of workplace discrimination. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30(1971). "[T]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the
statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
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The Court has made similar, though more oblique, comments in related con-
texts. In a freedom of expressive association case, the Court stated that "acts of
invidious discrimination ... cause unique evils that government has a compel-
ling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may
transmit," and added, "[a]ccordingly, like violence or other types of potentially
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communica-
tive impact, such practices are entitled to no constitutional protection.,
265
But application of the secondary effects doctrine to workplace harassment
law has highly problematic implications for First Amendment jurisprudence.
First, the doctrine eviscerates the viewpoint-neutrality requirement in cases in
which no compelling state interest is at stake.2 66 Prior to the Court's adoption of
this doctrine, the government had to combat such problems as crime and
property devaluation only in a way that was viewpoint neutral with respect to
any incidental restriction on speech. By allowing legislatures to circumvent this
long-standing First Amendment requirement, the Court has offered them count-
less new excuses for viewpoint-based suppression of speech.267
Second, unlike other precepts permitting a reduction in First Amendment
protection, the boundaries of the secondary effects doctrine are extremely
vague. The lack of a clear, principled distinction between legislation directed at
primary versus secondary effects of speech exposes the doctrine to exploitation
by a government that wishes to censor.
These problems are well illustrated by the Court's opinion in Boos v. Barry.268
The case involved a District of Columbia statute outlawing the display of any
sign, within 500 feet of a foreign embassy, that tends to bring the foreign
government into "public odium" or "public disrepute." The District govern-
ment argued that the law was justified because it was not aimed at the content of
antigovernment speech itself, but only at the secondary effect of offending the
dignity of foreign diplomats. The Court struck down the statute on the ground
that the emotional impact of speech on its listeners is a "primary" effect,
inseparable from the speech itself, and thus cannot support the use of the
secondary effects exception. 269 The majority suggested, however, that it might
in the past to favor [certain identifiable groups of] employees over other employees." Id. But see R.A. V,
505 U.S. at 410-11 (White, J., concurring) (stating that Title VII does not fit within secondary effects
exception).
265. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984). The theory that the Court will
uphold hostile environment harassment against a First Amendment challenge is further supported by its
decision not to address any First Amendment issues in the Harris case, even though the case was
limited exclusively to verbal harassment and both parties as well as numerous amici briefed the issue.
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
266. Although there are situations in which viewpoint neutrality is not absolutely necessary (such as
those in which a restriction of speech is supported by a compelling state interest and is narrowly
tailored), see supra text accompanying notes 198-99. such neutrality is typically an essential prerequi-
site to the preservation of free speech rights.
267. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (pluralilty opinion) (Brennan, J., concurring).
268. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
269. Id. at 320-21; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989) (finding antiflag-burning
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have upheld the identical viewpoint-based restriction on expression if the
legislature had asserted that the law was not intended to regulate antigovern-
ment speech itself, but only the secondary effects of such speech, such as
"congestion," "interference with ingress and egress," "visual clutter," or "secu-
rity. '2
70
As the Court's dicta in Boos makes clear, the secondary effects doctrine
provides a loophole through which a legislature may manipulate its way into
viewpoint-based regulation of speech. As Justice Brennan pointed out in dis-
sent, the government could plausibly argue that gatherings of certain political
parties are more likely than others to attract large crowds causing congestion, or
that speakers delivering a controversial message are more likely than others to
attract an unruly audience that could present security problems.27' Thus, the
doctrine "creates a possible avenue for government censorship whenever cen-
sors can concoct 'secondary' rationalizations for regulating the content" of
speech.72 This potentially enormous expansion of the state's power to censor
expression is deeply troubling.
Thus far, the Court has been restrained in its use of the secondary effects
doctrine, relying on it only to uphold statutes restricting sexually explicit
expression, such as nude dancing and adult films. 273 Because such expression
274 Corhas long been accorded diminished First Amendment protection, the Court
could contain the dangers inherent in the doctrine by restricting its applicability
to sexually explicit speech. Thus far, at least one current Justice-David
Souter-has indicated his approval of such a strategy.2 75
Although a portion of the harassing speech that may contribute to the creation
of a hostile work environment is sexually explicit, much of it is not. The
expression regulated by harassment law also includes a wide variety of gender-
specific abuse and nonexplicit sexual propositions.276 If the Court relies on the
secondary effects doctrine to uphold Title VII over a free speech challenge, it
law aimed at preventing "serious offense" to viewers geared toward primary, not secondary, effect of
speech); Forsythe County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (finding parade fee not aimed
at secondary effects).
270. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
271. Id. at 335 (Brennan, J., concurring).
272. Id.
273. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 50 (1976). In Boos, the Court suggested that the secondary effects
exception may allow the regulation of political, antigovernment speech on the ground that the law was
directed at a secondary effect. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. However, because the Court struck down the
statute in question, this analysis is dicta and does not necessarily represent an expansion of the
doctrine's reach to political speech.
274. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 586 n.3 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)
(asserting that sexually explicit speech such as nude dancing may be of lesser societal importance than
other forms of expression); Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 & n.2 (same with respect to adult films displaying
"specified anatomical areas").
275. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582-86 & n.3 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Boos, 485 U.S. at
337-38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
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would substantially expand the doctrine's reach, and with it the state's potential
censorship power.
CONCLUSION
To determine the constitutionality of the law's restrictions on hostile environ-
ment harassing speech, one must weigh the obstacles it creates to equal employ-
ment opportunity against harassers' rights of free expression on the job. Professors
Browne and Volokh have given inadequate weight to the equal opportunity side
of the scale by seriously underestimating the harm that verbal harassment
inflicts on women workers. Harassing speech subjects women to severe or
pervasive abuse while their male counterparts are free to perform their jobs
without facing such obstacles. It causes many women to suffer physically and
psychologically, and often has an adverse effect on their job performance. The
government's interest in eradicating discriminatory harassing speech from the
workplace could hardly be more compelling, because it fulfills the mandate of
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
Professors Browne and Volokh are not the only ones who have failed to
understand the gravity of the harm caused by harassing speech. The lower
courts have lagged far behind the Supreme Court on this issue, siding with
harassers in far too many cases. These opinions are driven not by a concern
about competing free speech interests, but by a deeply disturbing willingness to
overlook gender-based employment discrimination, even in conduct-based harass-
ment cases. The real-world enforcement record on this issue should lay to rest
the abstract fear that the courts will apply the law in an overbroad fashion. They
are doing just the opposite. The recalcitrance of numerous lower courts to
provide women workers with equal opportunity demonstrates the need for
judicial education; trial judges must begin to grasp the serious consequences of
discriminatory workplace harassment, whether verbal or physical in nature, and
must begin to impose liability when women prove that they were subjected to a
hostile work environment.
On the other end of the spectrum, Professor Sangree's analysis gives enor-
mous deference to equality interests. She asserts that by fostering equality,
hostile environment restrictions actually enhance freedom of expression. This
argument, while appealing, would require a fundamental transformation of First
Amendment jurisprudence. Regardless of whether this view prevails, as support-
ers of hate speech regulations and critical race theorists hope, such a sweeping
change is not a necessary prerequisite to the constitutionality of hostile environ-
ment harassment law. In contrast to broadly defined, wide-ranging hate speech
restrictions, workplace harassment law is fairly narrow in scope and is amen-
able to traditional First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis.
There is an important constitutional interest in protecting the free speech
rights of workers who wish to engage in or listen to gender-based abusive or
harassing expression. Workers, like any other group of citizens, have a vital
need to express themselves freely, and the First Amendment forcefully protects
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their right to do so before or after work, on the streets, and in their homes. But
what Professors Browne and Volokh fail to recognize is that the workplace is
different. Both commentators focus on the content of workplace harassing
speech-dubbing it "political" and therefore at the heart of First Amendment
protection-and ignore the context in which it occurs. The physical context of
the job site effectively traps the victims of harassing and abusive speech so that
they cannot avoid it. And because harassing speech is prohibited only when it is
explicitly or implicitly condoned by the target's employer, the power hierarchy
that operates in the workplace makes "more speech" an unrealistic option.
These factors reduce the strength of First Amendment interests in the work-
place; what may be said with impunity outside of the workplace may be
regulated within it.
Professor Sangree, in contrast, places so much emphasis on the importance of
the workplace context that she abdicates any real concern about workers' free
speech rights. Her focus on the captivity of female employees blinds her to the
reality that most worksites have within them relatively private settings, in which
women are not captive and can avoid gender-specific abusive or harassing
speech. She fails to recognize that in these portions of the workplace, such as a
personal locker or a protected corner of a private office, pornography or other
gender-based material will not create a differential, adverse environment for
women workers. In these avoidable areas, an employee should be free to post or
engage in whatever speech he desires.
The Supreme Court has effectively balanced the interests of equality of
opportunity and freedom of speech through the five elements that define a
hostile environment harassment claim. These elements ensure that only the most
extreme, persistent, and unwelcome forms of speech are subject to regulation,
while providing substantial breathing room for harassers' expression.
The Court's indication that it might rely on the secondary effects doctrine to
uphold harassment law over a free speech challenge, however, is a move in the
wrong direction. The secondary effects doctrine lacks clearly defined, principled
boundaries. An expansion of its reach beyond sexually explicit speech would
dangerously increase the potential for abuse of the government's censorship
power.
In sum, the current formulation of hostile environment harassment law strikes
the best possible balance between the fundamental interests of equal opportu-
nity and free speech thus far articulated. The Supreme Court and the EEOC
Guidelines have created a regulatory system that passes the strictest First
Amendment scrutiny, while taking a giant step toward eradicating the most
widespread problem faced by women on the job.
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